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I. Introduction
Since1965 a network of Federallyfunded community health centers (CHCs)
hasdeveloped in the United States to deliver comprehensive ambulatorycare,
bothprimary and preventive,to poverty populations in medically underserved
areas.The program to create and fund these centers, originally termed
neighborhood health centers, was started by the Office of Economic Opportu-
nity as part of the War on Poverty. By 1973 overall control ofthe centers
had beenshifted to the Bureau of CommunityHealthServices (BCHS), Health
ServicesAdministration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, and
thecenters began to be referred to as community health centers. Funding
authority for the centers rests in Section 330 of the Public Health Ser-
vicesAct. New and smallervariants of the basicCRC modelwere createdin
1975and1978 by the introduction of the Rural Health Initiative and the
UrbanHealth Initiative, respectively. Concomitantwiththese legislative
developments, the numberof CHCS increased from 51 in 1968 to104 in 1974
andtoapproximately 800 in 1980.1
Insome respects CHCs resemble prepaid group practice organizations,
commonly termed health maintenance organizations (HMOs). CHCs deliver
ambulatory care in a group practice setting with salaried physicians. Yet
there are obvious differences between the centers and liMOs. The clientele
of the centers primarily are poor. In addition, some services delivered by
centers are billed to patients and third—parties, most notably Medicaid, on
a fee—for—service basis.—2—
CHCs are part of a larger Federal system for the direct delivery of am-
bulatory care to low—income groups throughout the U.S. The principal addi—
tional projects in this system are maternal and infant care projects,
children and youth projects, and family planning clinics.2 This system
differs from Medicaid which is solely a mechanism for financing the ambula-
tory care services of poor people. Unlike the other members of the system,
CHCs are not limited in terms of the types of services provided or the age
classes of low—income people who receive services.
The purpose of this paper is to assess the efficiency of CHCs in deliv-
ering ambulatory medical care to poverty populations. In particular, we
evaluate the extent to which centers select input mixes that minimize the
cost of a given output. We focus on the employment of physician aids
(nurses, physician assistants, and related personnel) because studies of the
production of ambulatory care in the private sector suggest that aids are
underutilized relative to physicians,3 while the General Accounting Office
(14) has criticized the centers for employing too many aids relative to
physicians.
We estimate a transcendental production function, compute the marginal
product of aids relative to physicians for each center, and compare it to
the location—specific relative price of an aid. The ratio of the former to
the latter equals one if a given center selects the cost—minimizing input
mix. Hence, the average value of the ratio indicates whether the CHC system
overutilizes or underutilizes aids.
We also examine the determinants and effects of departures from cost
minimization by computing an index of inefficiency for each center. Since
grants are not tied to particular services rendered, centers who derive
most of their revenue from this source relative to Medicaid and private—3—
insuranceshould have a greater incentive to provide a given mix of services
in the least—cost method. This hypothesis and others are tested via a
multiple regression analysis of the index of departure from cost minimiza-
tion.Moreover, the index is included as anindependent variable in multi-
ple regression estimates of average cost functionsof ambulatory care.This
procedureenables us tocalculate the magnitude of the cost savings asso-
ciated with movements toward a more appropriate input mix. In addition, it
provides impacts of other variables on average cost net of their impacts on
departures from cost minimization. Estimates of average cost functions are
valuable intheirownrightbecause they convey useful information aboutthe
extentof economies of scale, the potential for exploiting these economies,
and thecharacteristics of high cost centers.
The importance of our research is highlighted by the current policy
debate with regard to the effectiveness, efficiency, and ultimate fate of
the CHCsystem. Thegrowth ofthis system has been curtailed sharply in
realterms by the Reagan Administration's budget cutbacks. Although the
centers were exempted from the block grantprogramin the fiscal 1982 budget,
starting in 1983 individual states have the option to takeoverthe CHC pro-
gram or leave it in Federal hands. If a state chooses to take control, it
must match a portion of the Federal support. In the proposedfiscal1983
budget,CHC8 arecombined with family planning clinics, migrant health cen-
ters, andblacklung clinics into a single block grant.Moreover, thestate
matchingpayment provision just mentioned is eliminated. If the CHC8 are
relatively inefficient producers of ambulatory care, the policies of the
ReaganAdministrationhave some merit. On the other hand, if the centers
are relatively efficient, the wisdom of these policies can be questioned.—4—
Wehave already mentioned that the General Accounting Office (14) has
charged that CHCs use too many aids relative to physicians. Yet the GAO
presents a very limited amount of data in support of its charges. In addi-
tion,it ignores the fact thatone of thegoals of the older centers in
particular is to provide employment and job training to the members of the
communitiesthat they service. ?reover, itfails to mention thatCHC5
havebeen muchmorereceptive thanotherdelivery systems, especially pri-
vate physicians, to the employment of new types of allied health manpower
such as physician assistants and nurse practitioners. Finally, the GAO
proposes no rigorous standards for efficiency.
Proponents ofthe CHC system cite evidence by Reynolds (3), Davisand
Schoen(5), and Link et al. (15) that utilization rates of ambulatory medi-
cal care by poverty populations who use CHCs are higher than utilization
rates of similar populations who must rely on other sources of care. Davis
and Schoen (5) suggest that the CHCpercapita ambulatorycostis comparable
to that in the U.S. as a whole once the nationaldata are adjusted tore-
flect the exclusion of X—ray, laboratory, and pharmacy costs from routine
private physicians' office visits. They present, however,verylimited
evidencein support of this position. Duggar et al. (16) find that Medicaid—
eligible CRC usershad lower per capita ambulatory cost than Medicaid—
eligiblenon—users in each of three study sites. A problem with their study
isthat non—users typically obtained ambulatory care from hospital, emer-
gency rooms and outpatient departments. Therefore, the cost structures and
staffing patterns of these sources reflect the joint production of outpatient
andinpatient care by hospitals.
Since it is difficult, if not impossible, to compare CRC ambulatory care
costswith ambulatory care costs of other institutions thatserve poverty—5—
populations, we focus on the NintelNefficiencyof the CHCsystem.Spe-
cifically, weexamine the extent to which input decisions by centers reflect
departures from cost minimization and the impact of these departures on the
total cost of care. We compare our results with those of similar studies
of the behavior of private physicians.
According to conventional wisdom, services in the public or non—profit
sector are produced less efficiently than in the private sector because of
the absence of a profit motive in the former sector. For example, the large
literature on public utilities suggests that utilities are too capital in-
tensive because the cost of capital is set at an artificially low level by
regulators. In a similar manner, the publicprovision and/or financing of
medicalcare often is characterized by cost—plus or fee—for—service reiin—
bursement of providers. Both reimbursement schemes promote inefficiency if
highcost producers arenot penalized or penalized less than theywould be
in the privatesector. Further, until fairly recently Medicaid reimburse-
mentrules in many states failed tocover services provided by paramedical
personneland thus encouraged overutilization of physicians relative to
suchpersonnel. Currently, reimbursement rules in at least some states
still are biased in favor of physicians.
Conventional wisdom notwithstanding, whether the production of anibula—
torycare in the public sector is less efficient than in the private sector
isan empirical issue. In particular, although incentives in favor of in-
efficient production exist, it is not known how the agents in the public
sector (the CHCs in our case) react to these incentives. Moreover, even
if the incentives do cause departures from cost—minimizing behavior, the
quantitative importance of these departures in terms of an increase in—6—
total cost is notknown.Thus, in undertaking this study, we seek answers to
three basic questions. What is the extent of departures from cost—minimizing
behavior by community health centers in the production of ambulatory care?
What arethe determinants of such departures? What are their effects on
total cost?
In addressing these issues, we recognize explicitly that incentives for
inefficiencyneed not causesignificant departures from efficient production.
An analogy from the private sector is instructive here. Reinhardt (8) finds
that private physicians, whose incentive structure clearly includes the
profit motive, use less than the optimal number of aids. We also recognize
that cHCs confront incentives for efficient production as well as inefficient
production. Federal, state,and local government grants are the major source
of funds to cover the expenses incurred by CECs. These grants finance
approximately 70 percent of the centers' costs, althoughthis percentage
variesconsiderably among centers (see Section III) •Thegrants bear some
resemblance to the capitation payments made by members of health maintenance
organizations.Since thegrants are nottied toparticular services ren-
dered,the centers, like HMOs, largely operate on fixed annual budgets.
Hence, both types of organizations have incentivestoprovide a given mix
ofservices in the least—cost method. Finally, we choose to address the
three questions citedabove because wedo not appreciate policy which is
not based on rigorous standards for the evaluation ofefficiency.4
In general the analysis of thedeterminants and effects of departures
from cost minimization in this paper represents a new innovation in the
empirical literature on cost and production. Thus, we make a methodolog-
ical as well as a policy contribution in the paper. Our contribution is—7—
particularly relevant because the issue of inefficiency in the not—for—
profit public sector will continue regardless of whether CHCs are placed
in a block grant and regardless of whether states gain more control of
the centers, other health programs, and non—health programs. We develop
aframeworkto evaluate and perhaps improve efficiency in one part of the
public sector, but our framework can be applied to many other parts of
this sector.
II. Analytical Framework
In the traditional economic theory of production, the firm isthe
fundamental behavioral unit.Afirm's production function relates its
outputto various inputs and to a measure of the level of technology. A
firm's cost function relates the total or average cost of output to out-
put, input prices, and the level of technology. If the firmminimizesthe
cost of a given output, the cost function is the "dual" of the production
function. By this is meantthatall the properties of the cost function
are knownoncethe properties of the production function are knownIfor
example,Shephard (18)]. Put differently, given sufficient information
about theproduction function, the estimation of the costfunctioncon-
veys no additional information.
We use the above concepts from the economic theory of production to
organize our econometric work on production and cost functions of anibula—
tory medical care in community health centers •Sincethe assumption that
centers are completely successful cost minimizers is questionable, we
estimate both these functions. Indeed, important components of our re-
search are to test the hypothesis that centers select the cost—minimizing
combination of inputs, to develop an index of inefficiencyor departure—8—
from cost minimization, and to examine the determinants of variations in
this index amongcentersand the effects of inefficiency on average cost.
Moreover,the estimation of average cost functions allows us to incorpor-
ate the impacts of indivisibilities, randomness of demand, and complex-
ities of large scale operations (see below) which are not fully reflected
inthe production function.
Our basic methodology maybeoutlined as follows. Let the production
function of output (xe) for the tth community health center be
='it''2t'''mt
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let be the price of input y, and denote the marginal product of
(ax/ay.) by ••Then,provided factor supply curves faced by each
center are infinitely elastic (centers take input prices as given), the
cost—minimizinginput mix satisfies
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or the absolute value of the slope of an isocost line must equal the abso-
lute value of the slope of an isoquant between y. andy.(the marginal
rateof substitution in production between the two inputs).5—9—
Definerj. as the ratio of the marginal rate of substitution between




Thisratio equals one if a given center selects the cost-minimizing combina-
tion of the inputs in question. A value ofrj. greater than one indicates
that the center uses too much of input y. in the sense that the same out-
put could be produced at a lower total cost by raising y and lowering y.
Similarly, a value of r., smaller than one indicates that the center uses
ijt
too little of input y. Therefore,itis natural to define the absolute
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Basedon the above, we estimate a production function for ambulatory
care delivered by CHCs, compute the marginal product of aids relative to
physicians for each center, andobtainnit usingthelocation-specific
relative price of anaid. When averaged over all centers the ratio
n
r..Cr,. Zr, /n) indicates whether the CIICsystemoverutilizes or
1, 1) ijt
undenutiljzeg aids. At the sautime,we computetheinefficiency index
Ce,, )foreach center andemploy it both asthe dependent variable in an
investigation of thedeterminantsof inefficiency andasanindependent
variable inmultiple regression estimates of average cost functions.— 10—
Adetailed description of the variables in the production andcostfunc-
tions is contained in Section III. In the remainder of this section, some
general comments are made about the methodology, including the interpreta-
tion of average cost functions, econometric considerations, and specific
functionalforms. Clearly, one does not have to assume cost minimization
in order to fit production functions. The use of ordinary least squares,
however, to estimate these functionshas been criticized because outputs
and inputsare jointly determined (Marschak andAndrews(19); Nerlove (20);
Mundlak(21)].If this is the case, then production functions should be
fitted by simultaneous equations methods such as two—stage least squares.
If ordinary least squares is employed, the resultingestimates maybe sub-
ject to simultaneous equations bias. A number of persons have shown,
however, that this bias is likely to be small in a wide variety of cases
(Hoch (22); Konijn (23); Griliches (24); Reinhardt (8)]. For this reason
and because almost all production function studies in the medical economics
literatureemploy ordinary least squares, we do not estimate production
functions by simultaneous equations methods.7
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where is the physician input, 2t is the physician aid input, and y
stands for other inputs (medical support and ancillary personnel such as
medical secretaries and laboratory personnel).8 This form, which was popu-
larized in the health economics literature by Reinhardt (8), has the11 —
propertythat output can be positive even if inputs 2t and 3t are zero.
This is an important property because many private sector physicians, as
well as some CHCs, do not employ aids. Note that the marginal rate of




Equation(7) reveals that the transcendental production function is
strongly separable in the sense that the marginal rate of substitution be-
tween any two inputs depends only on those two inputs. Moreover, the
cost-minimizing input ratios depends on output and the absolute amounts of
the inputs. This is in sharp contrast to the Cobb-Douglas and other
homothetic production functions, whose cost—minimizing input ratios are
independent of output. A priori, a2 should be positive and a3 should be
negative. Although an isoquant between and 2t could be convex to the
origin even if a3 were positive, the physician input would be an inferior
factor of production (a factor whose employment falls as output rises with
input prices held constant) if a3 were positive.9 Obviously, it is un-
realistic for the physician input to be inferior.
In computing the ratio of the marginal rate of substitution between
physician aids and physicians to the relative price of an aid for each CHC,
we employ a location—specific relative price variable. This is because the
centers are located throughout the United States and therefore face differ-
ent input price ratios (see Section III). Observe that our procedure of
computing r2i separately for each center and then averaging the ratio— 12—
overall centers yields a simple t—test of the hypothesis that r21 is sig-




where a is the sample standard deviation of r21. Observe also that, if a
center employs no aids, its marginal rate of substitution is a3 a
Provided this rate is less than or equal to relative price of an aid
(w2/w1t), such a center is minimizing the cost of a given output, and
is set equal to one.
It is worth mentioning that, even if each center faces the same relative
input price, r21 differs from a measure computed at the sample means of 2t









where is the sample correlation coefficient between lt and 2t' is
the standard deviation of y, and c12 is the standard deviation of
Since is negative and p12 is positive (large centers use more of both
inputs), r21 exceeds r21. Typically, estimates of r21 are given in studies
of the efficient choice of aids by private sector physicians. [for example,
Reinhardt (8); Brown and Lapan (13)1.10 In our view is a more— 13—
appropriatestatistic because incentives for inefficient input decisions may
vary greatly among firms, physicians, or CHCs.
It is also worth making a distinction between the efficient choice of
inputs or allocative efficiency and technical efficiency. The latter per-
tains to the amount of output obtained from a given quantity of inputs)"1
An evaluation of the technical efficiency of CHCs requires a comparison be-
tween this system and another health care delivery system. Technical effi-
ciency is not studied here because the goals, structure, and clientele of the
dC systemare unique. Put differently, in a fundamental sense the compari-
son involved is between "apples and oranges."
By fitting an average cost function, we address directly the issue of
the extent of economies of scale. If average cost falls as output rises,
the average cost function is said to exhibit economies of scale. If aver-
age cost rises as output rises, the cost function is said to exhibit dis—
12
economies of scale.
Most economists posit a U—shaped average cost function [for example,
Johnston (30); Friedman (31); Walters (32); Stigler (33); Becker (34)].
Given this function, average cost first declines as output rises, reaches
a minimumvalueat a certain output, andthenbegins to rise as output
rises. The declining segment of the average cost curveisattributed to
the fixed costs of hiring and training labor and installing andwarmingup
machines. In a basic sense, these fixed costs canbetraced to "indivis—
ibilities": community health centers, for example, cannot hire half a
physician or buy half an X—ray machine. Of course, the centers can hire a
half—time physician or buy an X—ray machine and keep it idle half the time.
These options, however, entail higher costs per physician hour or machine— 14—
hourthan iftheinputs are utilized on a full-time basis. Average cost
alsomay fall initially if the production function has a range of increas-
ing returns toscale (see note 12). Anothersource of declining average
costis randomness of demand (for example, Chiswick (35)]. For instance,
on anygivenday, the administrator of a community health center cannot
predict with perfect certainty the numberofpatients who will desire ser-
vices. Hence, in order to treat a certain percentage of potential patients,
some amount of excess capacity is required. As output and the average num-
ber of patients treated rises, the variability in demand tends to decline
and less excess capacity is required.
The increasing complexity of large scale operations is the basic cause
of an increase in average cost with output beyond some point. In the case
of CHC5, average cost may rise beyond some point because of a fixed amount
of the own time input of the chief administrator or project director of the
center. Another consideration is that, if the administrator is a non—
physician, he may find it very difficult to monitor the activities of a
large number of highly skilled physicians (DuBois (36)]. Moreover, the
objectives of the administrators of CHCs may differ from the objectives of
the board members •Toparaphrase an example by Becker (34), administrators
have incentives to increase their incomes and can do this in spite of
policingefforts by board members via large expense accounts, pleasure
trips, and fancy offices. As centers get larger, it is more difficult to
prevent administrators from engaging in these actions because the board
members have other responsibilities. A final source of risingaverage cost
isa segment of the production function that exhibits diminishing returns
toscale.— 15—
Inassessing the extent of economies of scale, it is important to keep
in mind that all relevant costs should be included. One type of cost that
oftenis ignored is the direct and indirect transportation costs incurred
by patients and employees to travel to and from community health centers.
The former pertain to direct or imputed outlays oncars, buses, taxis, or
trains. The latter pertain to travel time multiplied by the opportunity
cost of this time. It is possible that average cost inclusive of trans-
portation cost rises as output rises, while average cost exclusive of
transportation costfalls)3
Afinding that average cost begins to rise beyond some output (econo-
mies of scale are exhausted beyond some output) conveys useful information
to policy makers with regard to the optimal size of CHCs. For example,
suppose that two centers in the same area are each operating on the de-
clining segment of their average cost functions and that their combined
output is smaller than or equal to the output that minimizes average cost.
Then the combined output couldbe produced at a smaller total cost if one
centerclosed or if the two centers merged. To cite another illustration,
suppose that the CHC program is to be expanded in a given area. If centers
in that area are operating at outputs beyond the minimum average cost out-
put,a newcenter should be built. If not, existing centers should be in-
creasedin size.
It should be noted that the existence of a U—shaped average cost curve
doesnotimply that each community health center should operate at the out-
put whereaverage cost is at its minimum value. Economically efficient
firmsminimize the average cost of given output rather than average cost
per se. Moreover, one would hardly recommend that high average cost CHCs— 16—
inmedically underserved andsparselypopulated rural areas should be closed.
Indeed, if transportation costs are added to production costs, these centers
might not be operating on the declining segment of their average cost func-
tions (see note l3)) Put differently, the closing of these centers might
raisetransportation costs by more than it lowers production costs.
In its most complete specification, the average cost function estimated
in Section IV hasaquadratic form:
2 ac=
80
+ + 32x. (11)
Ifthe true average cost function is U—shaped, then is negative, 82 is
positive, and ac is at a minimum when x =— 81/282.Since there are no
data on transportation costs, any finding with respect to a minimum average
cost output is interpreted with caution.
A problem encountered in the estimation of average cost functions is
that of the "regression fallacy" (for example, Friedman (38); Johnston (30)].
From an econometric point of view, suppose that output Cx) contains measure-
ment error. Then so does average cost (ac) since ac is computed in part from
x. Hence, errors of measurement in the dependent variable are correlated
with errors of measurement in the independent variable. It follows that the
parameter estimate of 81 is biased away from zero (biased upward in absolute
value), while the parameter estimate of 82 is biased toward zero. Therefore,
the computed output that minimizes average cost exceeds the theoretical out-
put at which this occurs. That is, the estimated regression overstates the
extent and importance of economies of scale.15
Theoretically, Friedman (38), Johnston (30), and others stress that in-
put decisions of firms will take account of random fluctuations in the demand— 17
for output. To accommodate these fluctuations, inputs will be underutilized
in periods when demand is unusually low and overutilized when it is unusually
high. Even if average cost is independent of expected (average) output,
average cost will be relatively high when output is unusually small and vice
versa.
To deal with problems associated with the regression fallacy in particu-
lar and to reduce errors of measurement in all variables in general, costs,
outputs, and inputs are averaged over the t-year period of 1978 to 1979.
Moreover,at one point we employ the technique ofinstrumental variables to
fit averagecost functions. This is a standard technique for treating
measurement errors in independent variables in a multipleregression. To
implement this estimation method,we fitaregression of x on a set of in-
strumentalvariables. From the regression, we obtain the predicted value of
x for each community health center and the square of the predicted value.
Finally, we fit the average cost function using the predicted values of x
and their squares rather than the actual values of x and their squares. If
the instrumental variables are uncorrelated with the errors in actual output
and average cost, the resulting estimates of the cost function are unbiased.
Average cost functions are obtained with and without the inefficiency
index (ejj) as one of the independent variables. The inefficiency index
equals zero if the actual input mix selected corresponds to the cost—
minimizing input mix. Nence, the regression coefficient of the inefficiency
index multiplied by its mean value gives the magnitude of the cost savings
associated with movements toward a more appropriate input mix. In addition,
when inefficiency is held constant in the average cost function, one obtains
impacts of other variables on average cost net of their impacts on depar-
tures from cost minimization, When efficiency is included as an independent— 18—
variable,the average cost function bears some resemblance to a long—run
average cost function. In the long run, the fixed factor, say capital, is
fixed at its optimal level; the ratio of the marginal product of capital
to that of labor (the variable factor) equals the relative price of capital;
and our inefficiency index is fixed at zero. Our estimated function is not
perfectly analogous to a long—run average cost function because the ineff i—
ciencyindex, while fixed, is not fixed at zero.
III. Empirical Implementation
A. Data
The basic data set employed in this paper is the Bureau of Community
Health Services Common Reporting Requirements data tape (hereafter termed
the BCRR tape). This data tape consists of reports filed with the BCHS on
a semiannual basis by community health centers and all other grantees re-
ceiving support from additional BCHS programs such as Title V children and
youth projects, Title V maternal and infant care projects, and Titles V and
X family planning clinics.16 We limit our analysis to the community health
centers on the tape and employ data for the years 1978 and 1979. In certain
cases we have augmented the tape with data from other sources; these sources
are discussed below. This is possible because the location of each center
(specific address, county, state, and region) is given. For reasons in-
dicated in Section II, most of the variables in our analysis are two—year
averages for the years 1978 and 1979. This period is selected for detailed
study because it enables us to include in the production and cost functions
the original neighborhood health centers as well as those funded as part of
the Rural and UrbanHealth Initiatives andother CRC programdesigns(see
17
note 1).— 19
Adetailed discussion of the measurement of variables in the production
and cost functions is contained in Section IlIB. Here it is useful to
point out the nature of the ambulatory medical care output, input, and cost
variables. The basic output proxy is a medical encounter, defined as an
encounter between a medical user (a patient) and a provider of medical care
who is employed by a community health center. A medical encounter may be
cross—classified as a primary care physician encounter, a medical or surgi-
cal specialist encounter, a midleve]. practitioner encounter, and a nurse
encounter)8 According to the BCHS glossary (41,p. 40): "To meet the en-
counter criterion, the provider must be acting independently and not assist-
ing another provider. For example, a nurse assisting a physician during a
physical examination by taking a patient's history or by drawing a blood
sample is not credited with a separateencounter.The nurse in this
instanceis simply participating in a physician encounter. An encounter
does not encompass such services as a laboratory technician drawing blood
or collecting urine specimens nor does itinclude anX—ray technician taking
anX—ray film." During any one visit toa CHC,apatient may have more than
one medical encounter. This would occur, for instance, if hesees a physi-
cianand then sees a nurse who is acting independently of the physician.
Primary care physicians consist of generalpractitioners, family prac—
titioners,internists, pediatricians, and obstetricians/gynecologists.
Medical or surgical specialists are physicians with a specialty other than
those included in the preceding category. Psychiatrists are excluded from
this category. Midlevel practitioners include physician assistants, physi-
cian associates, nurse practitioners, and certified nurse—midwives. Nurses
include clinical nurse specialists, registered nurses, licensed practical— 20—
nurses,and licensed vocational nurses. For each type of provider, the num-
ber employed in the center is given on a full—time equivalent basis. This
is obtained by dividing the sum of total annual hours worked by each type
of provider by 1,600 hours. In addition, the number of full-time equivalent
medicalnonproviders is indicated. This category consists of medical sup-
port andancillarypersonnel. It includes nurse aids, medical clerks, medi-
cal secretaries, laboratorytechnicians,X—ray technicians, pharmacists,
andpharmacist assistants. The centersutilize salaried personnel, National
Healthservice corps (NHsC)personnel,Comprehensive Employment and Training
Act (CETA) personnel, and non—salaried personnel whose services are obtained
on a consultational, contractual, or donated basis. All such personnel are
includedin the input measures on afull—time equivalent basis.
Totalmedical carecostsare costs directly associated with medical en-
counters as well as ancillary costs for laboratorytests,X—rays, anddrugs.
Totalcosts can bedivided into direct costs and indirect or overhead costs.
Directcosts primarily consist of personnel costs (salaries, fringe benefits,
and related costs), drug costs, laboratory supply costs, and depreciation or
rental of medical equipment. Indirect costs are administrative costs and
facility costs. The latter pertain to the costs of using and maintaining a
center's plant——utilities, space rental,and building depreciation.
Personnelcosts include consultant costs and contractual services as
well as the costs of salaried personnel. Estimates of the dollar values of
any donated labor and material are made by each center. These estimates
primarily pertain to the salaries of NHSC and CETA personnel which are paid,
at least in the first instance, by the Federal government)9 iany centers
deliver dental care and social and comeunity services as well as medical— 21—
care.This means thatindirectcosts must be allocated among a variety of
services. Therefore, the well—known problem of the allocation of joint
costs arises. Facility costs are distributed to medical care based on
thepercentage of square footage occupied by medical facilities. Adminis-
trative costs are distributed based on the percentage of all direct costs
accountedfor by medical care. Although these allocation rates are some-
what arbitrary, medical care is by far the most important service deliv-
ered by CHCs and the one that absorbs the largest percentage of resources.
The centers aggregate encounters and costs to an annual basis in the
second semiannual report filed in each year. Hence, only these reports
are used, and input as well as cost and output data are taken from them.
The universe of CHCS forinclusion in the production and cost function is
limitedto those with an initial service year (the year in which the
center began to deliver services) of 1978 or earlier.20 There are 518
such centers.21 A frequency distribution of these centers by region and
size of county is showninPanel A of Table 1.
Theactual number of centers in the production and cost functions
equals 325.Centersare deleted iftheyfailed tofile a report in the
second reporting period of 1978 or 1979. They also are deleted if any of
the following key variables is missing in either year: medical users,
primary carephysicians, onsite primary care physician encounters, total
22 directmedical care cost, total medical care cost, and total receipts.
Finally, centers are deleted if they had less than one—fifth of a full—
time primary care physician in either year or if reported totalmedical
care cost was equal to or less than reported total direct medical care
cost in either year. The former exclusion eliminates very small centers— 22—
TABLE1
Frequency Distribution of Community Health Centers
by Reqion and Size of County
Size of
County All Greater Lesser Semirural
Region Counties Metropolitanb MetropolitanC Adjacentd or Iura1e
PanelA:All CHCs with Initial Service Date of 1978 or Earlier (n =518)
Northeast 19.51 7.34 6.18 2.32 3.67
North Central 17.57 5.41 2.70 3.09 6.37
South 41.31 4.44 11.97 9.46 15.44
West 21.61 6.56 4.63 3.86 6.56
All Regions 100.00 23.75 25.48 18.73 32.04
Panel B: Sample of CECs Studied in this Paper (n =325)
Northeast 21.53 8.00 7.38 2.77 3.38
North Central 16.62 5.54 3.08 2.77 5.23
South 41.55 4.62 11.39 10.46 15.08
West 20.30 5.23 5.23 4.92 4.92
All Regions 100.00 23.39 27.08 20.92 28.61
(Footnotes on following page)— 23—
Footnotesto TABLE 1
aEach cell entry gives the percentage of all centers in that cell.
b.in Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) with
population of one million or more in 1970.
ccounties in SMSAs with population of less than one million in
1970.
dcounties adjacent to the metropolitan counties and having easy
access to the central city in the metropolitan area.
ecounties other than those in the first three groups.— 24—
whoare open less than one full day per week. The latter exclusion elimi-
nates centers who have reported inaccurate data. A frequency distribution
of the sample of 325 centers by region and size of county is shown in
Panel B of Table 1. A comparison of Panels A and B of the table reveals
that the locational distribution of the sample is very similar to the lo-
cational distribution of the universe of 518 centers. Moreover, the per-
centage of neighborhood health centers (NHCs) in the sample (20.9 percent) is
almost identical to the percentage in the universe (19.1 percent). It can
be concluded that the sample is representative of all CHCs with an initial
service year of 1978 or earlier.
Note that the Bureau of Community Health Services uses certain per-
formance indicators when it reviews grants by CHCs for continued funding.
Two of these pertain to onsite medical encounters per physician and cost
per medical encounter. Since the BCHS standards for these indicators are
contained in the reporting manual (39), the centers have an incentive to
report inaccurate data. The possibilities that there are errors in our
basic data are mitigated, however, because the centers compute and report
the performance indicators in tables that are not used in our analysis.
Nevertheless, we consider an empirical test of the accuracy of our data in
Section IV.
B. Specifications
Table 2 contains definitions, acronyms, means, and standard deviations
of all of the dependent and independent variables in the production and cost
functions. The specification of these functions is discussed in the re-
mainder of this section. A discussior of the specification of an equation
to determine inefficiency in the selection of inputs is postponed until— 25—
TABLE2
Definition of Variables in Production and Cost FUflCOflSaIb
Standard
Variable Mean Deviation Definition
I. Production Function
A. Dependent Variables
1. LNOME 9.482 .948Natural logarithm of number of onsite medi-
cal encounters
2. LNWOME 12.580 .960Natural logarithm of number of weighted on—
site medical encounters; weights are the
average costs of a primary care physician
encounter, a physician aid encounter, and
an encounter with a medical or surgical
specialist other than a primary care
physician
B. Independent Variables
1. pcp 3.583 4.144Number of full—time equivalent primary care
physicians; includes general practitioners,
family practitioners, internists, pediatri-
cians, and obstetricians/gynecologists
2. LNPCP .920 .800Natural logarithm of preceding variable
3. PA 4.440 6.860Number of full—time equivalent physician
aids; includes nurses,nurse practitioners,
physician assistants, and related personnel
4. PASQ 66.626 386.683Square of preceding variable
5. MS .226 .617Number of full—time equivalent physicians
with a medical or surgical specialty other
than specialties included in the primary
care physician category; excludes psychi-
atrists
6. MSSQ .431 2.325Square of preceding variable




B. Independent Variables (continued)
7. 0 10.226 14.651Numberof full—time equivalent medical sup-
portand ancillarypersonnel; includes
nurseaids, medical secretaries; laboratory
technicians,X—ray technicians, pharmacists,
andrelatedpersonnel
8. OSQ 318.576 1,162.823Square of preceding variable
9.FMO4 .158 .087Fractions of medical users ages 0 to 4,
10. FM59 .086 .0295 to 9,10 to 19, and65 and over, respec—
11.FM1O19 .200 .043tively; omitted category is fraction of
12. FM6S .088 .056medical users ages 20 to 59
13. AGE 4.218 3.493 Numberof years that a center had been in
operation as of 1979
14.OCH .791 .407 Dichotomous variable thatequals one if a
centeris not a neighborhood health center
15.FPAE .291 .221Fractions of onsite physician aidencoun—
16. FMSSE .024 053ters andmedical—surgicalspecialist en-
counters, respectively; omitted category
pertains to fraction of onsite primary
carephysician encounters
II. Average Cost Function
A.Dependent Variables
1. ADMC 21.399 7.484Average direct medical care cost in 1978
dollars







1. o 21.283 31.301Number ofonsite medical encounters in
thousands
2. OMESQ 1,429.7059,643.793Square of preceding variable
3. FPAE .291 .221See I.B, variables 15 and 16
4. FMSSE .024 .053
5. FOE .083 .102Fraction of offstte medical encounters
6. FMO4 .158 .087See I.B, variables 9—12
7. P1459 .086 .029
8.FM1O19 .200 .043
9. FM65 .088 .056
10. AGE 4.218 3.493SeeI.B, variable 13
11. OH .791 .407See I.B, variable 14
12. PCPNI 61.154 6.922Annual net income of primary care physi-
ciansin private practice in thousands of
1978 dollars by region and size of county
13. NE 11.132 1.070 Annual full—time earnings of nurses em-
ployed in hospitals in thousandsof 978
dollars by region and sizeof county
14.OHPE 8.648 1.052Annual full—timeearnings of hospital per-
sonnel other thannurses, staff physicians,
interns, residents, and other trainees in
thousands of l78 dollars by region and
size of county
(continued on next page)— 28—
TABLE2 (concluded)
Standard
Variable Mean Deviation Definition
B.IndependentVariables(continued)
.108Fractions of acenter's receipts obtained 15.MEDICAID • 079
16.MEDICARE .027 .035from Medicaid,Medicare, private insurance
17.PVTINS .060 .111companies, and patients,respectively;
18.PATIENT .135 .152omitted category pertains to fraction of
receipts obtained from Federal, state,
and local government grants
19.Mu 7.187 10.360Number of medical users in thousands
aMeans andstandarddeviations pertain to the sample of 325 centers described
in the text.
theexception of AGE, OCR, PCPNI,NE,and OHPE, all variablesare based
ondata for 1978 and 1979. Number of onsite medical encounters, number of medical
users, andinputs are two—year averages. All ratio variables are obtained by the
sutingthenumeratoranddenominatorfor the twoyearsseparately andthen
dividing.
cSee text for a more detailed definition.— 29—
SectionV. It should be realized that the average cost function specified
in this section is one in which direct measures of inefficiency are excluded.
1. Production Function
Like other health care delivery systems, the ultimate or final output
of community health centers takes the form of improvements in the health of
its users. Encounters between users and health care providers may be viewed
as the intermediateoutput of CHCs. Inthe estimated productionfunction,
thisintermediate output--the natural logarithm of onsite medical encounters
(LNOME)——is related to inputs. Onsite encounters are those that occur in
CHCs themselves rather than in other locations. They are emphasized because
the input measures pertain to the staff that work in CHCs.23
There are four input variables in the production function. These are
the numberof primary care physicians (PCP) and its natural logarithm
(LNPCP), the number ofmedical and surgical specialists (MS) and its square
(MSSQ), the number of physician aids (PA) and its square (PASQ), and the
number of medical support and ancillarypersonnel (0,where the acronym
denotespersonnel other than those in the first three categories) and its
square (OSQ). Nurses and midlevel practitioners are aggregated into a com-
bined physician aid input for reasons indicated below. In Section V both
the efficient choice of physician aids relative to primary care physicians
andtheefficient choice of medical support and ancillary personnel (other
personnel) relative to primary care physicians are considered. The efficient
selection of medical and surgical specialists relative to primary care physi-
cians is not studied because only 37 percent of all CHCs employ specialists.24
The types of cases treated by centers mayaffectthe output obtained
from a given set of inputs. Since actual casemix differences are not— 30
available, four variables reflecting the age distribution of medical users
are employed to control for casemix. These are the fraction of users ages
0 to 4 (FMO4), the fraction ages 5 to 9 (FM59), the fraction ages 10 to 19
(FM1O19), and the fraction ages 65 and over (FM65). The number of years
that a center has been in operation (AGE) also may affect the output ob-
tained from a given set of inputs. This is particularly true if technical
efficiency in production is an acquired skill. A dichotomous variable
that denotes a CRC that is not one of the original neighborhood health
centers (OCR) is added because the NHCs deliver a somewhat broader range
of services than the other centers. Whether this factor has an independent
effect in the production function is an empirical issue.
An obvious problem with the number of medical encounters as the
measure of output is that varying amounts of output may be associated with
encounters with different providers. For example, it is reasonable to
suppose that a physician encounter yields a greater amount of output than
a physician aid encounter. If the proportions of encounters with various
providers vary among community health centers and are correlated with the
inputs, estimates of the production function are biased.
The problem of adjusting CRC ambulatory medical care output for "en-
counter—mix" is similar to the problem of adjusting hospital output for
casemix. The latter problem has been considered in detail by Feldstein(25)
in his study of the British National Health Service, and we use two of the
adjustment techniques that he has developed. One technique is to include
avector of encounter—mix proportions in the production function. These
are the fraction ofonsite medical encounters with physician aids (FPAE)
and the fraction of onsite medical encounters with medical—surgical— 31—
specialists(FMSSE). The omitted category pertains to the fraction of on—
site medical encounters with primary care physicians.
The second technique is to replace the simple sum of medical encoun—
3
ters in the tth CHC (x =Ex.)bythe "weighted" sum of encounters.
i=l
With the latter measure, more weight is given to encounters that yield
more output. In the context of CHCdata,Feldstein's procedure is to
weight an encounter with the th provider by the sample average cost of an
encounter with that provider (ac1). Hence, the weighted output of a given
CHC (z.) is
3
z. = Eac.x. . (12) it ut
i=l
The natural logarithm of this measure (LNWOME) replaces LNOME as the depen-
dent variable in alternative specifications of the production function.25
Althoughthe average cost of all medical encounters in each CHCand in
the sample as a whole easily can be computed, there are no data on the sample
average cost of an encounter with a specific provider. Under the assump-
tion that the ac. are constant (independent of the number of encounters),
the sample average costs can, however, be estimated from a multiple regres-
sion. Letacbe the average cost of medical encounters in the tth cRc,







ac = + — 2t + — 3)3t (l$)
Given observations for each center, the last equation specifies a regression
of ac on 2t and 3t The intercept of the regression is an estimate of
ac1, and the regression coefficient of p (i =2,3) is an estimate of
—— 26 ac.—ac.
3- 1
The actual regression equation is
ADMC =23.087 —4.671FPAE +20.022FMSSE —9.912FOE
(t =29.22) (t =—2.53) Ct=2.62) (t =—2,47)
=.066, F =7.50
The dependent variable is average direct medical care cost (ADMC) because of
the somewhat arbitrary accounting rules used to allocate indirect costs.
The fraction of offsite medical encounters (FOE) is included as an indepen-
dent variable because of fsite costs cannot be excluded from total costs.
Based on the regression, the average direct cost of an onsite encounter with
a primary care physician is $23.09 in 1978 dollars. The average direct cost
of an onsite encounter with a physician aid is $18.42, and the average di-
rect cost of an onsite encounter with a medical—surgical specialist is
$43.l1.27
2. Average Cost Function
Average direct medical care cost (ADMC) and average total medical care
cost (ATMC) are employed as alternative dependent variables in the average
cost function. Both are used because of the problem of allocating indirect— 33—
costsamong theservicesprovided by CHCs. The numerator of average direct
medical care cost equals total direct cost in 1978 plus total direct cost
in 1979 in 1978 dollars. The 1979 data are deflated by the physicians'
services component of the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The denominator of
ADMC equals total medical encounters (onsite and offsite) in 1978 plus
total medical encounters in 1979.28 offsjte encounters are included in the
denominator because offsite costs cannot be excluded from total costs.
Average total medical care cost is constructed in a similar manner.
The number of onsite medical encounters (OME) and the square of this
number(OMESQ) are enteredinto the cost function to explore the extent and
importance of economies of scale.The weighted encounter variable is not
usedas analternativeoutput measure because itisderived underthe
assumptionthat average cost is constant. We want to test this assumption
inthe context of empirical estimates of average cost functions.29 In the
instrumental variable regressions, the number of medical users (MU) serves
as the instrumentfor the numberofonsite medical encounters. To take
account of differences in casemix andinencounter—mix, the same age dis-
tribution variables(FMO4, FM59, FMlOl9, FM65) and encounter—mix propor-
tions (FPAE, FMSSE) included in the production function are included in the
costfunction. Since offsite costs cannot be subtracted from total costs,
variations in the fraction of offsite encounters (FOE) among centers are
held constant. The number of years that a center has been in operation
(AGE)andwhether or not it is one of the original neighborhood health
centers (OCH) may have independent effects on average cost. These may be
due in part to differences in casemix and in scope of services that are not
reflectedby other variables.— 34—
InSection I of this paper, it was indicated that alternative financing
mechanisms havethe potential to affect incentives to cost minimize and
therefore average cost. CHCs receive approximately 70 percent of their
receipts from Federal, state, and local government grants, although this
percentage varies considerably among centers (standard deviation =24per-
cent). Since the grants are not tied to particular services rendered, the
centers largely operate on fixed annual budgets and have incentives to pro-
vide a given mix of services in the least—cost method. These incentives
are diluted by increases in the proportions of receipts obtained from
Medicaid (MEDICAID), Medicare (MEDICARE), and private health insurance com-
panies (PVTINS). On the other hand, incentives to cost minimize may be
expanded by an increase in the proportion of receipts obtained from patients
(PATIENT). This is because most of the clientele of CHC5 are poor. There-
fore, centers that must rely on patients for a relatively large proportion
of their receipts face a considerable amount of uncertainty with regard to
whether and when these payments will be made.
Funds obtained from the above four sources include those received on a
fee—for—service or prepayment basis, but fee—for—service funds cannot be
distinguishedfrom prepayment funds. The prepayment basis is relevant be-
cause thedesign of certain non—NHCs, especially those established in the
early 1970s, emphasized the delivery of services on a prepaid capitation
basis,with Medicaid as the sourceof prepayment where possible (see note 1).
The centers were not, however, successful in attracting Medicaid funds for
this purpose [Roemer (7)]. Therefore, the fraction of receipts obtained on
aprepaid basis is likely to rise as thefraction of receipts obtained from
patientsrises. In addition the fraction of prepaid funds is likely to be
larger in non—NHCs.Prepayment encourages cost minimization relative to— 35—
fee—for—servicepayment, but its impact relative to funding from grants is
ambiguous.If, however, centers anticipate that some portion of a poten-
tial current deficit can be financed by future grants, there is an addi-
tional factor that predicts negative effects of the fraction of a center's
receipts obtained from patients anditsstatus as a non—NHC on average cost.
The final set of variables in the cost equations pertains to the prices
orwages of inputs employed by the centers. Inputprices are not available
on a center—specific basis on the BCRR tape because personnel costs cannot
be disaggregated. Even if input prices could be estimated by, for example,
dividing primary care physician costs by the number of full-time equivalent
physicians, the value of the resulting measure would be questionable. This
is because centers in the same local market area should pay the same price
for physicians of a similar quality or skill level given perfect competition
in input markets.3° If the measure just described indicates that they do
not, then it may reflect variations in skill levels of physicians among
centers rather than true differences in the price of the physician input.
The prices of three types of inputsemployed by CHCs are taken from
surveysconducted by the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) and by
the American Hospital Association (AEA). The former is used for the wages
of primary care physicians, while the latter is used for the wages of physi-
cianaids andmedical support and ancillary personnel (other personnel).
Ideally, these wages should be specific to the county in which a given cen—
tsr is located. A significant number of centers, however, are located in
small counties (see Table 1). Especially in the HCFA survey, county-level
mean wage rates would be based on a small number of observations. Moreover,
there are no physicians from some counties in the HCFA survey. For these
reasons, mean wages are estimated by region and size of county. The ten— 36—
Federalregions and the four county sizes defined in Table 1. are employed in
these computations, so thatwagesareobtainedfor forty region—county size
cells.3'A given center then is assigned wage rates that correspond to the
cell in which it is located.
The wage of primary care physicians is proxied by annual net medical
practice income of primary care physicians (PCPNI) from the HCFA Physician
Practice Cost Surveys of 1977 and 1978. Both surveys are used to maximize
the number of observations on which a given region—county size mean is
based. Net income in the 1977 survey pertains to 1976, while net income in
the 1978 survey pertains to 1977. Income in each year is expressed in 1978
dollars based on the all commodities component of the cpi.32
The wage of physician aids is measured by annual full—time earnings of
nurses employed in hospitals (NE). The wage of medical support and ancillary
personnelis measured by annual full—time earnings of hospital personnel
other thannurses, staffphysicians, interns, residents, andother trainees
(OHPE). Both measurescome from the AHA annual survey of hospitals, pertain
to1979, and are converted into 1978 dollars. Nurses include registered
nurses, licensed practical nurses, and licensed vocational nurses. Full—
time earnings of nurses in one of the forty region—county size cells equal
the total nurse payroll of all hospitals in that cell divided by the total
numberof full—time equivalent nurses employed. Inthe computation of the
number offull—time equivalent nurses, one part—time nurse is counted as
one—halfof a full—time nurse. Similar comments apply to the computation of
full—time earnings of other hospital personnel.
Conceptually, input prices should include fringe benefits as well as
wages. Thus, the relevant price of input y in location c (region—county— 37—
sizecell c) is
w. =w (l+k ) (15)
ic ic ic
where w is the wage per employee and is the ratio of the wage per em-
ployee to the fringe benefit cost per employee. Suppose that ki is inde-
pendent of c,and suppose that the w.Ci =1,2, 3) rather than the are
employed as independent variables in the cost function. Then regression co-
efficients and their standard errors are multiplied by 1 + k1, leaving sta-
tistical tests of significance unaffected. In addition, if is the same
for all inputs, the relative price of input y. can be measured either by
AA 33
w/w. or by w/w.
Fringebenefits definitely are excluded from the AHA earnings data and
from thenetpractice income of salaried physicians. Whether or not amounts
thatself—employed physicians spend on pensions, health insurance, andlife
insurance areexcluded from their net practice income is problematic. These
outlays should be excluded if the physician is incorporated since they can be
almost fully deducted from income in computing incometaxliabilities.Tax
deductionsare much more limited for unincorporated physicians.Hence,the
measured price of a physician aid relative to that of a physician mayunder-
state the true price. In theinefficiencyanalysis in Section V,we comeent
on thesensitivityof theresultsto such an understatement.
Nursesand midlevel practitioners are aggregated into a single physician
aid input in the productionfunctionpartlybecause location-specific data
onearningsof midlevel practitioners are extremely limited. This aggrega-
tion is less arbitrary than itmayappear. Brn and Lapan (13)reportthat
hourlywage ratesof registered nurses and physician assistants arealmost— 38—
identical.To be sure, licensed practical and vocational nurses are less
skilled than either registered nurses or physician assistants. But since
CHCs focus to a large extent on fairly routine primary and preventive care,
the potential exists to exploit substitution possibilities between less
skilled and more skilled assistants.
IV. Empirical Results: Production and Cost Functions
Empirical estimates of production and cost functions are presented in
this section. All empirical results pertaining to the efficient choice of
inputs are presented in Section V. Therefore, the average cost functions
presented in this section are those in which direct measures of inefficiency
are excluded.
A. Production Functions
Four alternative estimates of ambulatory medical care production func-
tions areshownin Table 3.Ineach regression thedependentvariable is
thenatural logarithm of weighted onsite medical encounters (LNWOME) •In
regression (3—1) the set of independent variables is limited to thefour
inputmeasures: the natural logarithm of primary care physicians (LNPCP)
and the arithmetic values and squares of physician aids (PA, PASQ), medical
or surgical specialists (MS, MSSQ), and other personnel (0, OSQ). In regres-
sion (3—2) the measures of the age distribution of medical users(FMO4,
FMS9, FM1O19, FM65) are included, while in regression (3—3) the center's
age (AGE) and the dichotomous variable that distinguishes NHCs from other
CHCs (OCH) are added. Finally, in regression (3-4) the arithmetic value of
primary care physicians (PCP) is included.
The regression coefficients of the four input measures have the "cor—
rect signs" in the sense that an isoquant between any two inputs has a— 39—
TABLE3






LNPCP .543 .534 .528 .598
(10.95) (10.42) (10.59) (7.91)
PA .053 .053 .053 .053
(6.37) (6.04) (6.21) (6.29)
PASQ —.004D—1 —.004D—1 —.004D—l —.004D—1.
(—3.12) (—2.95) (—3.00) (—2.69)
0 .034 0.035 0.026 0.025
(5.82) (5.85) (4.19) (4.05)
OSQ —.003D—l —.003D—1 —.003D—]. —.002D—1
(—5.02) (—5.08) (—4.08) (—2.69)
MS .269 .259 .206 .208
(2.56) (2.45) (1.99) (2.01)
MSSQ —.041 —.036 —.021 —.018
(—1.57) (—1.39) (—.82) (—.72)
FMO4 —.109 —.161 —.158
(—.30) (—.46) (—.45)
FM59 1.065 .604 .720
(.98) (.57) (.67)
FM1O19 —.666 —.530 —.593
(—.90) (—.73) (—.82)
FM65 —.614 —.489 —.484
(—1.06) (—.87) (—.86)























R2 .791 .793 .806 .806
F 171.24 108.78 99.11 92.30
at_ratios in parentheses. The critical t—ratios at the 5 percent
levelare 1.64 for a one—tailed test and 1.96 for a two—tailed test.
The F—ratio associated with each regression is statistically signifi—
cantat the 1percent level of significance.— 41—
downwardsloping segment and is convex to the origin in that segment.34
Moreover, thesecoefficients are very stable across alternative specifica-
tions. All coefficients except those pertaining to MSSQ and PCP are sta-
tistically significant.35 According to regression (3-3)——the preferred
specification for reasons indicated below——the output elasticity of
primary care physicians is .528. Evaluated at sample means, the output
elasticities of the other inputs are .218 for physician aids, .044 for
medical—surgical specialists, and .204 for other personnel.36 Hence, the
returns to scale parameter at the point of means is .994, indicating con-
stant returns to scale at that point.
Variations in the age distribution of medical users among centers have
little impact on the amount of output obtained from a given set of inputs.
On the other hand, technical efficiency is sensitive to the number of years
that a given center has been in operation. In particular, older centers
get more output from their inputs. The regression coefficients of LNPCP,
0, and MS are reduced slightly when age of the center is held constant.
These reductions are not dramatic because older centers use more of all in-
puts. Apparently, the age effect is divided ecually among three of the
four inputs when the age variable is omitted. The original status of a CEC
as an NHC has no independent effect on output, although it should be noted
that NHCs are approximately five years older on average than non—NHCs.
When age is deleted, the coefficient of OCH becomes significant.
Production functions in which the dependent variable is the natural
logarithm of onsite medical encounters (LNOME) are shown in Table 4. The
parameter estimates of these functions are very sensitive to the inclusion
of the two encounter—mix proportions (FPAE, FMSSE) •Inparticular, when— 42—
TABLE 4
Estimates of Medical Care Production Functions, Dependent Variable:
Regression Number
Variable 4—1 4—2 4—3 44 45
LNPCP .508 .499 .493 .649 .678
(10.08) (9.60) (9.72) (12.40) (9.12)
PA .062 .062 .062 .030 .031
(7.37) (6.96) (7.13) (3.23) (3.26)
PASQ —.005D—i. —,005D—l —.005D—l —.002D—1 —.002D—1
(—3.89) (—3.66) (—3.72) (—1.27) (—1.15)
0 .034 .035 .027 .024 .024
(5.72) (5.75) (4.18) (4.10) (4.02)
OSQ —.003D—1 —.003D—1 —.002D—1 —,002D—1 —.002D—1
(—4.76) (—4.83) (—3.89) (—3.50) (—2.64)
MS .147 .138 .088 —.028 —.021
(1.38) (1.29) (.84) (—.22) (—.17)
MSSQ —.023 —.019 —.005 .007 .008
(—.89) (—.73) (—.19) (.27) (.28)
FMO4 —.015 —.070 —.132 —.133
(—.04) (—.20) (—.39) (—.40)
FM59 1.114 .676 .703 .749
(1.01) (.62) (.70) (.74)
FM1O19 —.623 —.486 —.491 —.518
(—.82) (—.66) (—.71) (—.75)
FM65 —.581 —.456 —.120 —.123
(—.99) (—.79) (—.22) (—.23)





































R2 .779 .781 .793 .822 .822
F 159.38 101.44 91.81 95.04 88.91
at_ratios in parentheses. The critical t—ratios at the 5 percent level
are 1.64 for a one—tailed test and 1.96 for a two—tailed test. The F—ratio
associated with each regression is statistically significant at the 1 per—
cent level of significance.— 44—
FPAEand FMSSE areheldconstant, the coefficient of LNPCP rises by slightly
more than 30 percent, the coefficient of PA is cut in half, and the coeffi-
cient of MS becomes negative. Note, however, that the fraction of onsite
physician aid encounters and the fraction of onsite medical—surgical spe-
cialist encounters have positive and statistically significant effects on
output. Note also that the numberofmedical—surgical specialists is posi-
tively correlated with the fraction of onsite medical—surgical specialist
encounters Cr =.665),and the number of physician aids is positively corre-
lated with the fraction of orisite physician aid encounters Cr =.242).
Therefore, it is questionable whether FPAE, for example, should be held con-
stant when themarginalproduct of PA is evaluated.
Forthe above reasons, the encounter-mix adjustment technique reflected
by theweightedoutput variable is superior to the adjustment technique re-
flected by the inclusion of the encounter—mix proportions in the production
function. Consequently, one of the production functions contained in
Table 3is employed in the inefficiency analysis in Section V. Since the
coefficient of PCP is not significant in regression (3-4), the preferred
specification is regression (3—3). This is the case because we want to
evaluate marginal rates of substitution in production between physician aids
andprimary care physicians and between medical support and ancillary per-
sonnel (otherpersonnel) and primary care physicians. Clearly, it is
preferable to use significant coefficients only in these computations.
InSection III it was pointed out that the existence of BCHS perform-
ance standards may give centers an incentive to report inaccurate data.
To the extent that centers act on these incentives, one would expect those
that receive relatively large proportions of their receipts from government— 45—
grantsto be more likely to overstate their output. This is because reim-
bursement from Medicaid and other third parties requires proof thatser-
vices were in fact delivered. To check theaccuracy of the data, the set
of variables indicating the proportions of receipts obtained from Medicaid
(MEDICAID), Medicare (MEDICARE), privatehealth insurance companies
(PVTINs), andpatients (PATIENT)was included in the production function
specificationgiven by regression (3—3). The test of the hypothesis that
no member of this set of four variables has a nonzero effect resulted in
an F—statistic of 2.74, which is not significant at the one percent level.
This result strengthens our confidence in the reliability of the basic
data.
B. Average Cost Functions
Average direct medical care cost (ADMC) regressions are presented in
Table 5, and average total medical care cost (ATMC) regressions are
presented in Table 6. Four specifications are shown in each table because
of intercorrelations among output, average cost, age of the center, and
sources of receipts. These correlations are highlighted in Table 7 which
shows that NHCs are older, produce more output, have higheraverage costs,
and derive a larger percentage of revenue from Medicaid than non—MECs.
The regressions in Tables 5 and 6 demonstrate that it is important tocon-
trol for center characteristics (AGE, OCH) and revenue sources (MEDICAID,
MEDICARE, PVTINS, PATIENT), especially the former, in assessing the impact
of onsite medical encounters(OME)onaverage cost.
Linear, rather thanquadratic,average cost functionsare shown in the
tablesbecause the square of onsite medical encounters (OMESQ) is omitted
from the set of independent variables. When OMESQ was included in the— 46—
TABLE 5





0i* .007 —.022 —.007 —.035
(.53) (—1.68) (—.56) (—2.64)
PCPNI .106 .054 .069 .114
(1.79) (1.23) (1.96) (1.54)
NE 1.738 1.137 1.288 .740
(3.80) (2.52) (2.76) (1.61)
OHPE .706 .784 .423 .502
(1.55) (1.80) (.94) (1.17)
FPAE —5.886 —5.875 —5.016 —4.975
(—3.16) (—3.31) (—2.75) (—2.86)
FMSSE 12.444 .946 6.013 —4.641
(1.64) (.126) (.80) (—.63)
FOE —3.952 —3.536 —4.287 —4.164
(—1.00) (—.93) (—1.10) (—1.11)
FMO4 —.068 —.062 —4.666 —3.257
(—.01) (—.01) (—.83) (—.60)
FM59 —10.796 —22.579 —20.555 —32.301
(—.65) (—1.42) (—1.25) (—2.04)
FM1O19 5.910 3.923 1.488 3.154
(.52) (.36) (.13) (.30)
FM65 —11.355 —15.133 —11.396 —11.323
(—1.22) (—1.70) (—1.21) (—1.26)
AGE .423 .434
(3.19) (3.31)

































R2 .180 .263 .237 .313
F 6.25 8.55 6.40 8.22
at_ratios in parentheses. The critical t—ratios at the 5 percent
levelare1.64for a one—tailed test and 1.96 for a two—tailed test.
The F—ratio associated with each regression is statistically signif—
icant at the 1 percent level of significance.— 48—
TABLE6





OME .005 —.027 —.012 —.042
(.32) (—1.59) (—.70) (—2.43)
PPNI .142 .101 .153 .121
(1.88) (1.38) (2.05) (1.68)
NE 2.014 1.354 1.365 .781
(3.44) (2.32) (2.29) (1.31)
OHPE 1.113 1.200 .784 .871
(1.90) (2.13) (1.37) (1.57)
PPAE —8.369 —8.347 —7.282 —7.229
(—3.51) (—3.63) (—3.12) (—3.21)
FMSSE 13.839 1.024 6.116 —5.401
(1.42) (.11) (.64) (—.56)
FOE —8.879 —8.536 —9.055 —9.009
(—1.75) (—1.73) (—1.82) (—1.85)
FMO4 1.481 1.354 —5.118 —3.687
(.20) (.19) (—.71) (—.52)
FM59 —9.995 —23.243 —20.841 —33.646
(—.47) (—1.12) (—.99) (—1.64)
ffl019 6.362 4.307 —.812 1.114
(.44) (.31) (—.06) (.08)
FM65 —7.698 —11.678 —7.912 —7.679
(—.64) (—1.01) (—.66) (—.66)
AGE .497 .486
(2.89) (2.86)

































R2 .179 .243 .239 .294
p 6.21 7.66 6.48 7.50
at_ratios in parentheses. The critical t—ratios at the 5 percent
level are 1.64 for a one—tailed test and 1.96 for a two—tailed test.
The F—ratio associated with each regression is statistically signif-
icant at the 1 percent level of significance.— 50—
TABLE7













ATMC 34.687 27.074— 51—
regressions,its coefficients never were significant. Moreover, in those
cases in which the coefficient of OME was negative and that of OMESQ was
positive, the output that minimized average cost either was beyond the
range of all observations or beyond the range of all but 1.8 percent of
the observations. Instrumental variable estimates are not presented be-
cause the use of this technique raised the coefficient of output in abso-
lute value and lowered the coefficient of the square of output. These
results suggest that the average cost functions in Tables 5 and 6 are not
marred by the regression fallacy.37
According to the results in Tables 5 and 6, output has negative and
significant impacts on average direct medical care cost and on average
total medical care cost once all other variables in the cost functions are
held constant (see regressions (5—4) and (6—4)]. Note that the output
effect is positive and not significant if the center characteristics and
the revenue sources are omitted (see regressions (5—1) and (6—1)]. Regres-
sions(5—2) and(5—3) or (6—2) and (6—3) showthatmore bias is introduced
bythe omission of the center characteristics thanbythe omission of the
revenuesources.
Although average direct cost and average total cost fall as output rises,
the elasticities of average cost with respect to output are very modest. At
the point of means, the elasticity of average direct medical cost with re—
spect to thenumberofonsite medical encounters equals —.035. Evaluated at
anoutputone standard deviation above the meanoutput, the elasticity
equals —.091.At two standard deviations above themean output, the elas-
ticity is —.153. The corresponding elasticities of average total. medical
care cost with respect to the number of onsite medical encounters are —.031
at the point of means, —.081 at an output one standard deviation above the— 52—
mean,and -.135 at an output two standard deviations above themean.38
Thus, the average cost functions slope downward in a statistical sense, but
in a practical sense they are very flat. Put differently, the departure
from constant average cost is very small.
Centers that obtain relatively larger percentages of their revenues
from Medicaid and private insurance companies have higher average costs,
while centers that obtain relatively large percentages of their revenues
from patients and Medicare have lower average costs. All effects except
for that associated with Medicare are statistically significant. Of the
significant effects, that pertaining to Medicaid is the most dramatic.
Consider two hypothetical centers that are the same in all respects ex-
cept that one obtains 100 percent of its revenue from Medicaid, while the
other obtains 100 percent of its revenue from grants. The first center's
average direct medical cost would exceed the second center's averagedi-
rect medical cost by $12.73. The corresponding average total cost differ-
ential would be $16.41. The impacts of Medicaid reimbursement, private
health insurance reimbursement, and patient reimbursement on average cost
are consistent with a priori notions about the effects of alternative
revenue sources on the efficient choice of inputs. The impact of Medicare
reimbursement is not consistent with these notions, but Medicare is the
least important source of the centers' revenues. On average, it accounts
39 .. foronly 2.7 percent of all revenues. In any case definitive conclusions
with respect to these issues must await the analysis of the determinants
and effects of allocative inefficiency in Section V.
A standard prediction from the theory of production is that an increase
in the price of an input used in the production process increases the aver-
age cost of output. In line with this prediction the three input price— 53—
proxies(PCPNI, NE, OHPE) have positive coefficients in the eight regres-
sions in Tables 5 and 6. In the most complete specifications of the cost
functions [regressions (5—4) and (6—4)], five of the six input price ef-
fects are significant at the 10 percent level. Only the coefficient of
physician net income (PCPNI) on average direct medical cost is, however,
significant at the 5 percent level. Note that the simple correlation co-
efficient between the annual full—time earnings of nurses employed in
hospitals (NE) and the annual full—time earnings of other hospital per-
sonnel (OHPE) is positive and fairly large (r =.534).When one of these
two variables is omitted from the cost equations, the coefficients of the
other are significant at the 1 percent level.40 Given the multicollin—
earity problem, the finding that the three input price measures have posi-
tive impacts on average cost and t—ratios greater than one is an important
and impressive one. It underscores that these measures are very good
proxies for the prices of the inputs actually used by CHC5.
with respect to the empirical roles of the other variables, average
cost is not in general related to differences in the age distribution of
medical users among CHCs. Older centers have significantly larger costs
that newer centers, and NHCs have significantly larger costs than non—
NHCs. In part these results may be traced to aspects of allocative in-
efficiency. They also may be due to variations in casemix and scope of
services that are not captured by other variables. As shownbythe co-
efficient of the fraction of offsite encounters (FOE), onsite encounters
are more expensive than offsite encounters, although the differentials
are not significant at the 5 percent level on a two—tailedtest.41 The
average direct cost differential between a primary care physician— 54—
encounterand a physician aid encounter of $4.98 is similar to the one esti-
mated from a regression of ADMC on FPAE, FMSSE, and FOE in Section III. The
average cost of a medical—surgical specialist encounter relative to a pri-
mary care physician encounter is very different from the one obtained in
Section III. This is partly because FMSSE is correlated with the center
characteristics and the revenue variables (compare regression (5—1) with
regression (5—4)] and partly because net income of specialists is excluded
from the regressions.
V. Empirical Results: Allocative Efficiency
In this section the performance of the CRC system with respect to the
efficientor cost—minimizing selection of inputs is examined. Both the
efficient choice of physician aids relativetoprimary care physicians and
the efficient choice of medical support and ancillarypersonnel(other per-
sonnel) relative to primary care physicians are treated. In SectionV.A
theextent of departures from efficientutilization of these inputs is
quantified. InSection V.B the determinants of inefficiency are studied,
and in Section V.C theeffects of inefficiency onthe total cost of
ambulatorymedical care are estimated.
A. Evaluation of Efficient Use of Inputs
To evaluate whether CHCs select the combinations of primary care physi-
cians and physician aids that minimize the cost of a given output, we com-
pute the marginal rate of substitution in production between aids and physi-
cians (MRSPAP) for each center, divide it by the location—specific relative
price of aids (WPAP —(PCPNI)(NE)], and average the resulting ratio
ERPAP =(MRSPAP)(WPAP) 1]over all centers. At thesametime, wecompute— 55—
anindex of inefficiency in the use of aids relative to physicians (EPA =
IRPAP—li).Similarly,tostudy the efficient choice of other personnel
relativeto physicians, we compute themarginalrate of substitution in
productionbetween these personnel and physicians (MRSOP), divide it by
the location—specific relative price of other personnel (WOP(OHPE)
(PcPNI)1], and average the resulting ratio (ROP =(MRSOP)(WOP)] over
all centers. At the same time, we obtain an index of inefficiency in the
use of other personnel relative to physicians CEOROP—l I).Inmaking
these computations, we employ the formula for the marginal rate of sub-
stitution given by equation (7) and the production function given by
regression (3—3) in Table 3.
Summary measures pertaining to these computations are shown in Panel A
(aids relative to physicians) and Panel B (other personnel relative to
physicians) of Table 8. The ratio of the marginal rate of substitution
between physician aids and physicians to the relative price of aids equals
1.644 and is significantly greater than one (t =8.59based on equation (8)].
The ratio of the marginal rate of substitution between other personnel and
physiciansto the relative price of other personnel equals .554 and is sig-
nificantly less than one Ct =—5.65).It follows that CHC5 underutilize
physician aids relative to physicians and overutilize other personnel rela-
tive to physicians. Put differently, the same output could be produced at
a lower cost by raising the ratio of physician aids to physicians and by
lowering the ratio of other personnel to physicians.
Thereis a considerable amount of variability in the marginal rate of
substitution—relativeprice ratios in Table 8. Thecoefficient of variation
ofRPAP equals82.5percentand thatof POP equals257.0 percent. This— 56—
TABLE8
Definition of Variables in Inefficiency Analysis
Standard
Variable Mean Deviation Definition
Panel A: Physician Aids versus Primary Care Physicians
1. spiP .305 .291 Marginal rate of substitution in pro-
duction between physician aids and
primary care physicians in absolute
value; ratio of marginal product of
aids to marginal product of primary
care physicians
2. WPAP .185 .030 Wage of a physician aids relative to
wage of primary care physicians;
PCPNI divided by NE
3. RPAP 1.644 1.356 Marginal rate of substitution between
physician aids and primary care phy-
sicians divided by relative wage of
aids; RPAP =(MRSPAP)(WPAP)1
4. EPA .906 1.229 Index of inefficiency in the use of
aids relative to physicians;
EPA =IRPAP-1l
PanelB: Other Medical Personnel versus Primary Care Physicians
1. t.iRsop .075 .229 Marginal rate of substitution in pro-
duction between other medical per-
sonneland primary care physicians in
absolute value; ratio of marginal
product of other personnel to mar—
ginalproduct of primary carephysi-
cians
2. wop .144 .027 Wage of other personnel divided by
wageof primary care physicians;
ORPE divided by PCPNI
(continuedon next page)— 57—
TABLE8 (continued)
Standard
Variable Mean Deviation Definition
Panel B: Other Medical Personnel versus Primary Care Physicians (continued)
3, ip .554 1.424 Marginal rate of substitution between
otherpersonnel and primary care phy-
siciansdivided by relative wage of
other personnel; ROP=(MRSOP)(WOP)
4.EO .539 .821 Index of inefficiency in the use of
other personnel relative th physi-
cians; EO =IRop—li
a Panel C: Determinants of Inefficiency
1.POV 19.375 12.048 Percentage of population in poverty in
countyin which a given center is
located
2.SOURCE .147 .400 Number of sources of medical care for
poorpeople per thousand poor people
in county in which a given center is
located in 1978. Number of poor
people equals population of the
countyin1978 multiplied by the per-
centage of the population in poverty
in 1969. Sources include number of
hospitals with outpatient departments,
numberof maternal and infant care
projects, number of children and
youth projects, and number of commu-
nity health centers otherthanthe
oneinquestion. All sources per-
tain to 1978
(continued on next page)— 58—
TABLE 8 (concluded)
Standard





Dichotomous variables that indicate
size of county in which a given cen—
.445
4.SIZE2 .209 .407
ter is located. SIZE1 equals one
for greater metropolitan counties
(countiesin SMSAs with population
5.SIZE3 .286 .453 of one million or more in 1970);
SIZE2 equals one for lesser metro-
politan counties (counties in SMSAs
with populationof less than one
million in 1970); SIZE3 equals one
foradjacent counties (counties
adjacent to the metropolitan coun—
ties and having easy access to the
central city in the metropolitan
area); omitted category pertainsto
semirural or rural counties
at.ants fromTable2 are not listed in this table.— 59—
variabilityis highlighted in Table 9, which contains frequency distributions
of RPAP (Panel A) andROP(Panel B). Note that, although CHCs employ too
few physician aids on average (RPAP exceeds one on average), approximately
31 percent of all centers employ too many aids (RPP is smaller than one
for 31 percent of the centers). Similarly, although the centers employ too
many other personnel on average approximately 21 percent of all centers
employ too few other personnel. Given the degree of variability in these
measures, it is very worthwhile to study the determinants of inefficiency
in the selection of inputs.
In Section III it was indicated that the relative prices of physician
aids and other personnel used here may understate the true prices because
the AHA earningsdata exclude fringe benefits. To examine the impact of
this potential bias, itwasassumed that the ratio of fringe benefits to
wagesequals 25 percent. Location—specific relative prices were multi-
plied by a factor of 1.25, and RPAP and P were recomputed. Clearly, this
adjustment lowers PPAP and ROP, but the former remains significantly
greater than one, while the latter remains significantly smaller than one.
Moreover, the results of the study of the determinants and effects of in-
efficiency are very similar to those reported in Sections V.B and V.C.
Instead of calculating PPAP and IP for each center and then averaging,
one can compute them at the sample means (see equation (9)]. Denoting the
resulting measures by RPAP and POP, one obtains RPAP =1.791and ROP =.958.
These estimates are misleading in two respects. In the first place, rela-
tive input prices vary among locations and centers. In fact, the coeffi-
cients of variation of WPAP and WOP (16.2 percent and 18.8 percent, respec-
tively) exceed the coefficients of variation of PCPNI, NE, and OHPE— 60—
TABLE9
Frequency Distributionof Marginal Ratesof
SubstitutionDivided by Relative Wage Rates
Interval Percent
Panel A: RPAP





















(11.3percent, 9.7 percent, and 12.2 percent, respectively). These patterns
emerge because physicians are relatively well paid in rural areas, while
nurses and other hospital personnel are relatively well paid in large urban
areas. Therefore, even if all centers desired to produce the same output in
the least—cost manner, they would employ different combinations of inputs.
In the second place, even if relative input prices do not vary, incentives
for inefficient input choices may differ among CHCs.42
Our results with respect to the underutilization of physician aids and
the overutilization of other personnel may be compared with studies of the
efficient selection of inputs by private sector physicians. Using samples
of physicians for 1965 and 1967 from Medical Economics, Reinhardt (8) con-
cludes that physicians underutilize aids. The aid input in his study per-
tains to the sum of registered nurses, medical technicians, and office aids.
Since he does not distinguish among inputs, his findings cannot be compared
directly with ours. Using data from the 1976 HCFA Physician Practice Cost
Survey, Brown and Lapan (13) conclude that physicians underutilize regis-
tered nurses, practical nurses, and physician assistants, overutilize
secretaries, and use about the correct number of technicians. Except for
the last finding, these results are very similar to ours. Moreover, Brown
and Lapan exclude from their sample physicians who belong to equal cost
sharing groups because they argue that such physicians may not have incen-
tives to minimize costs. The point we wish to emphasize is that there is
little evidence that profit—motivated private physicians make more effi-
cient selections of inputs than CHCs.43— 62—
B.Determinants of Allocative Inefficiency
Table 10 contains regressions in which the dependent variable is the in-
dex of inefficiency in the selection of physician aids relative to physi-
cians (EPA). This index is highly correlated (r =.675)with the index of
inefficiency in the selection of other personnel relative to physicians
(Eo).44 Results obtained with the latter index as the dependent variable
are very similar to those obtained in Table 10. We focus on the determi-
nants of EPA because it has a larger impact on average cost than E0 (see
Section V.C). Seven regressions are presented in the table because we view
the analysis of the determinants of inefficiency as tentative and explora-
tory rather than as definitive and conclusive. In all regressions the mea-
sures pertaining to the age distribution of medical users are included. We
have no specific hypotheses concerning the effects of these variables, but
it is worth controlling for differences in casemix among centers. In any
case, only four of the twenty—eight age distribution effects are signifi-
cant at the 5 percent level——those associated with the fraction of users
ages 65 and over in regressions (10—3), (10—4), (10—5), and (10—7),
We have already developed hypotheses with regard to the impacts of the
fractions of receipts obtained from various sources on inefficiency (see
Section III). Dramatic evidence in support of these hypotheses is revealed
by the regressions. Regardless of the other variables held constant, in-
creases in the fractions of receipts received from Medicaid and from private
health insurance companies cause statistically significant increases in in-
efficiency, while an increase in the fraction of receipts received from
patients leads to a statistically significant reduction in inefficiency.
The coefficient of the Medicare variable has the "wrong sign," but it is— 63—
TABLE10
Determinants of Inefficiency in the Selection of
Physician Aids Relative to Physicians
Regression
Variable 10—1 10—2 10—3 10—4
Number
10—5 10—6 10—7
FMO4 .426 —.449 .607 .169 .241 —.110 .301
(.49) (—.50) (.95) (.27) (.38) (—.12) (.47)
FMS9 3.332 2.388 4.308 3.348 2.588 4.617 2.677




(.30) (.63) (1.98) (2.47) (2.72) (1.30) (3.02)
AGE .105 .035 .038 .039
(5.04) (2.20) (2.47) (2.53)
OCH —.663 —.210 —.114 —.068
(—3.76) (—1.61) (—.88) (—.49)
MEDICAID 4.339 2.092 1.941 1.789
(7.15) (4.75) (4.38) (3.83)
MEDICARE —.774 —1.161—1.708 —1.338
(—.40) (—.86) (—1.27) (—.96)
PVTINS 2.179 1.191 1.377 1.305
(3.80) (2.95) (3.43) (3.20)
PATIENT —1.585 —.811 —.589 —.537
(—3.61) (—2.63) (—1.88) (—1.65)







































R2 .228 .220 .597 .622 .634 .146 .638
F 15.70 11.14 67.00 57.67 49.38 5.98 33.98
at_ratios in parentheses. The critical t—ratios at the 5 percent level
are1.64 for a one—tailed test and1,96for a two—tailed test. The F—ratio
associated with each regression is statistically significant at the 1 per-
cent level of significance,— 65—
notsignificant. Moreover, as already noted, CHCs receive a very small
proportion of their receipts from Medicare. Of the three significant f i—
nancing effects, that associated with the Medicaid variable is the largest.
In the most complete specification [regression (10—7)], a hypothetical cen-
ter that is fully funded by Medicaid would have an inefficiency index 1.79
points larger than a center that is fully funded by grants. To gauge the
magnitude of this differential, note that the inefficiency index has a
mean of .91 and a standard deviation of 1.23. Hence, the differential is
very large; it amounts to 196.7 percent of the mean of the inefficiency
index and to 145.5 percent of the standard deviation of the index. Put
differently, an increase in the fraction of Medicaid receipts from zero to
one raises the inefficiency index by almost one and one—half standard devi-
ations.
It was indicated in Section III that non—NHCs are likely to receive a
larger percentage of receipts on a prepaid basis than NHCs. This percent-
age also is likely to be negatively related to the number of years that a
center has been in operation. These factors suggest a positive effect of
AGE on inefficiency and a negative effect of OCH. Another reason for ex-
pecting these effects is that the newer non—NHCs designs emphasize small
group practices which offers a somewhat limited range of services. To the
extentthat largescale operationspromote inefficiency (see below), non—
NHCsshould be more efficient than NHCs, and newer centers should be more
efficient than older centers. A final reason for expecting such effects
is that the design and funding of newer centers and non—NHCs occurred at a
time when the emphasis of U.S. health policy shifted from a concern with
equityinthe l960s to a concern with efficiency in the 1970s. Support— 66—
forthese hypotheses is contained in the regressions in Table 10. The co-
efficient of AGE is positive and significant in all regressions in which
it is included. The coefficient of OCR always is negatIve, but it is sig-
nificant only when the number of onsite medical encounters is excluded
from the regression. Of course, AGE and OCR are negatively correlated.
When the former variable is omitted from the regressions, the coefficients
of the latter are negative and significant.
Theoretically, the effect of output, measured by the number of onsite
medical encounters, on inefficiency is expected to be U-shaped. That is,
inefficiency first should decline as output rises, reach a minimum value
at a certain output, and then begin to rise as output rises. The forces
that generate this relationship are similar to those that generate a
U—shaped average cost function. The principal source of declining ineffi-
ciency is randomness of demand. On any given day, the administrator of a
CRC cannot predict with perfect certainty the number of patients who will
requireservices. Hence, in orderto treat a certain percentage of poten-
tial patients, some excess amountofthe key physicianinput is required.
As outputrises, the variability in demand tends to decline and a more
appropriateinput mix can be selected. The increasing complexity of large
scale operations is the basic cause of an increase in inefficiency beyond
some output. If the chief administrator of a CRC is a nonphysician, he
may find it difficult to select the cost—minimizing mix of a large number
of highly skilled physicians relative to other inputs. Even if the admin-
istrator is a physician, the limited amount of his own time input may
inhibit the selection of an appropriate combination of inputs at large
output levels.— 67—
Theestimated output effects, given by the coefficients of the number
ofonsite medical encounters (ONE) in regressions (10—3), (10—4), (10—5),
and (10—7), are positive and very significant; the t—ratios range from
15.45 to 18.32. Moreover, the impacts are numerically large. Based on
regression (10—7), a one standard deviation increase in output causes the
inefficiency index to rise by .42 of a standard deviation.Linear,
rather than quadratic, output effects are shown in Table 10. If the
squareof output (OMESQ) isadded to the set of independent variables in
regression(10—7),the coefficient of OMESQ is negative and significant,
while that of ONE is positive and significant.45 The output that "maximizes"
inefficiency occurs, however, beyond the range of observations. These re—
suits suggest that the forces associated with the complexity of large scale
operations dominate those associated with randomness of demand throughout
the range of output. Although the output effect diminishes in the qua-
dratic specification, it is larger than in the linear specification even
when evaluated at an output two standard deviations above the mean output
(.039 versus .024). Therefore, the coefficient of ONE in regression (10—7)
is a conservative lower bound estimate of the impact of output on ineffi-
ciency.
The natural logarithmof the weighted numberof onsite medicalencoun-
tersis the dependent variable in the production function. Therefore, the
parameter estimates of output in Table 10 would be biased if the disturbance
term in the production function were correlated with the disturbance term in
the inefficiency equation. To examine the extent of this bias, the total
numberof medical users (TMU)wassubstituted for the number of onsite
medical encounters in regression (10—7). The coefficient of Thuwas— 68—
.063(t =12.88).This result strengthens our confidence in the importance
andmagnitudeof the output effect.
It is possible the impact of randomness of demand on inefficiency de-
pends on the characteristics of the county in which a given center is
located rather than on output per se. For example, demand might be more
unpredictablein a sparsely populated county, in a county with a small
percentageof the population in poverty, and in a county with numerous
alternative sources of ambulatory medical care forpoorpersons. To ex-
plore thisnotion, the following county—specific variables are included in
regressions (10—6) and (10—7): the percentage of the population in poverty
(POV); the number of sources of ambulatory medical care for the poor per
thousandpoorpeople(SOURCE); and dichotomous variables thatidentify
greater metropolitan counties (SIZE1),lesser metropolitan counties (SIZE2),
adjacentcounties (SIZE3), and semirural or rural counties(the omitted
category).These measures,which are defined precisely in Panel C of
Table 8,are constructed from the BCRR tape and from the Area Resource
46 File.
Thereis little evidence in the regression analysis that county charac-
teristics are important determinants of inefficiency. In regression (10—6),
which omits all center characteristics except the age distribution of users,
the coefficients of POv and SOURCE have the wrong signs and are not sig-
nificant. County size does appear to have a U—shaped effect on ineff i—
ciency. CHCs in small rural or semirural counties are less efficient than
those in other counties, and these differentials are significant. Centers
in lesser metropolitan and in adjacent counties are equally efficient
(compare the coefficients of SIZE2 and SIZE3), while centers in greater
metropolitan counties are less efficient than those in the two preceding— 69—
typesof counties. The county size differentials are not, however, signif-
icant once all center characteristics are held constant [see regression
(10—7)]. In the full regression the poverty variable has the correct
negative sign, but it is not significant. The coefficient of SOURCE still
is negative and not significant.
In summary, it is notable that our exploratory regression analysis
"explains" up to 64 percent of the variation in the inefficiency index.
Consistent with a priori notions, alternative mechanisms for financing
CHC5 affect the efficient choice of inputs in the predicted directions.
Older centers are less efficient than newer centers, and larger centers
are less efficient than smaller centers.
C. Effects of Inefficiency on Costs
To estimate the cost savings associated with movements toward optimal
input mixes, the inefficiency indexes are included in average cost func-
tions in Tables 11 and 12. Table 11 contains simple regressions of average
direct medical care cost (ADMC) and average total medical care cost (ATMC)
on the index of inefficiency in the selection of physician aids relative to
physicians (EPA) or the index of inefficiency in the selection of other per-
sonnel relative to physicians CEO). Either index has a positive impact on
average cost, but the effect of EPA exceeds that of EA. Moreover, the co-
efficients of EPA are significant at the 1 percent level, while the coeff i—
cients of EO are not. In the full average cost specifications in Table 12,
the coefficients of EPA fall somewhat relative to those in Table 11 but
retain their significance. In particular, the average direct cost effect
is significant at the 5 percent level, while the average total cost effect
is significant at the .5 percent level. On the other hand, when EO— 70—
TABLE11
Regressions of Average Cost on Inefficiency Indexesa
Variable
ADMC Regressions ATMC Regressions

















R2 .067 .009 .081 .014
p 23.31 3.01 28.37 4.49
at_ratios in parentheses. The critical t-ratios at the
5 percent level are 1.64 for a one—tailed test and 1.96 for
a two—tailed test. The F-ratios associated with regressions
(11—1) and (11—3) are significant at the 1 percent level;
those associated with regressions (11—2) and (11—4) are not
significant at the 1 percent level.— 71—
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at_ratios in parentheses. The critical t-ratios at the 5
percent level are 1.64 for a one—tailed test and 1.96 for a
two—tailed test. The F—ratio associated with each regression
is statistically significant at the 1 percent level of sig-
nificance.— 73—
replacesEPA in regressions similar to those in Table 12, its coefficient in
the ADMC function is not significant at the 5 percent level. In addition,
the coefficient of EPO in the ATMC function is not significant at the .5
percent level.
The above points are emphasized because EPA and EO are highly correlated
(r =.675).When both variables are included in average cost functions with
no additional regressors, the coefficients of EPA rise relative to those in
Table 11, while the coefficients of EO become negative. When both are in-
cluded in regressions similar to those in Table 12, the coefficients of each
are positive. In some instances the coefficient of EPA alone is signifi-
cant, while in other instances neither is significant.47 In all cases the
coefficient of EPA exceeds that of EO. Given the strong positive relation-
ship between EPA and E0 and given the greater precision with which the EPA
effects are estimated, the cost savings computations are based on regres-
sions that exclude EO. These computations should be interpreted as the
joint impacts of movements toward the optimal mixes of physicians relative
to physician aids and of physicians relative to other personnel on average
cost. To the extent that EPA is positively related to the inefficient use
of such additional inputs as space and capital equipment, these inefficien-
cies also are reflected in the computations.
The inefficiency index equals zero if the actual input mix selected
corresponds to the cost—minimizing input mix. Hence, the regression co-
efficient of the inefficiency index multiplied by its mean value gives
the cost associated with allocative inefficiency or the cost savings asso-
ciated with the elimination of this phenomenon. Based on regressions
(11—1) and (11—3), average direct medical care cost would fall by $1.43
in 1978 dollars and average total medical care cost would fall by $2.00— 74—
in1978 dollars if allocative efficiency were eliminated. Since the average
value of onsite medical encounters equals 21,283 encounters, these savings
amount to a $30,435 reduction in total direct cost on average and a $42,556
reduction in total cost on average. Put differently, the total direct
cost of the entire CHC system would fall by 6.7 percent and the total cost
of the system would fall by 6.6 percent. The comparable estimates from
Table 12 are a $.84 drop in average direct cost, a $1.80 drop in average
total cost, a $17,878 decline in the total direct cost of a typical center,
a $38,309 decline in the total cost of such a center, a 3.9 percent reduc-
tion in the total direct cost of the CHC system, anda 6.3percent decline
in the total cost of the system.48
The calculations based on Table 11 are upper bound estimates of cost
savings because EPA is related to variables that influence average cost
with inefficiency held constant. For instance, an increase in the fraction
of receipts received from Medicaid raises EPA and also raises average
cost. Since EPA effects in Table 12 are smaller than those in Table 11,
the coefficients of EPA are biased upward by the omission of correlated
regressors. The calculations based on Table 12 are lower bound estimates
becauseintercorrelations among EPA andother variables lead to somewhat
impreciseestimatesof the partial effect of each variable. In any event,
the system—wide cost reduction due to the elimination of allocative ineff i—
ciency appears to be rather modest; it ranges from 6.3 to 6.6 percent of
total cost. In sunmary, the empirical results in Section V indicate that
there are statistically significant departures from cost—minimizing be-
havior. These departures have statistically significant determinants and
statistically significant positive effects on average cost. But the
magnitudes of the average cost effects are not large.— 75—
Theestimated parameter of a given variable in the complete average
cost function in Table 5 or 6 (regression (5—4) or (6—4)] is the sum of the
direct effect of that variable on average cost and the indirect effect that
operates through allocative inefficiency. The inclusion of the inefficiency
index in the average direct or average total cost function in Table 12 per-
mits us to isolate the direct effects and to compare them with the corre-
sponding total effects. These comparisons are made in Panels A and B of
Table 13 for the variables that are important determinants of inefficiency:
the center's age; the fractions of revenues obtained from Medicaid, private
health insurance companies, and patients; and the number of onsite medical
encounters. Note that, if the signs of the figures in the last column are
ignored, they give the indirect effect through allocative inefficiency as a
percentage of the direct effect.
The most dramatic parameter changes pertain to those associated with
onsite medical encounters. The negative output effect in the average di-
rect cost function rises by 68.6 percent when the inefficiency index is
held constant. The corresponding increase in the average total cost func-
tion is a whopping 119.0 percent. These results occur because the total
impact of output on average cost reflects two forces that go in opposite
directions. The direct effect is negative due to the existence of econo-
mies of scale. But the indirect effect is positive because larger centers
use less efficient input mixes than smaller centers. Although the effects
of output on average cost rise in absolute value when inefficiency is held
constant, the elasticities of average cost with respect to output remain
fairly small. In the average direct cost function these elasticities are
-.059 at the point of means, -.159 at an output one standard deviation— 76—
TABLE13
Total and Direct Effects of Selected Variables in Average Cost Functions
Total Effect
Variable (absolute value)
Direct Effect Percentage In-
crease (+) or
Decrease (_)a (absolute value)
Panel A: ADMC Regressionsb
AGE .434 .401 —7.60
MEDICAID 12.728 11.046 —13.21
PVTINS 9.777 8.656 —11.47
PATIENT 6.951 6.488 —6.66
OME .035 .059 +68.57
Panel B: ATMC RegressionsC
AGE .486 .417 —14.20
MEDICAID 16.407 12.817 —21.88
PVTINS 9.550 7.157 —25.06
PATIENT 10.213 9.226 —9.66
OME .042 .092 +119.05
aDfid as the ratio of the direct effect to the total effect minus
one multiplied by 100.
bTotai effects are taken from regression (5—4) in Table 5. Direct
effects are taken from regression (12—1) in Table 12.
CTotaleffectsare taken from regression (6—4) in Table6.Direct
effects are taken from regression (12—2) in Table 12.— 77—
abovethe mean output, and —.280 at an output two standard deviations above
the mean output. In the average total cost function the corresponding
elasticities are —.068, —.188, and —.337. Therefore, the average cost
functions in Table 12, like those in Tables 5 and 6, are fairly flat; the
departures from constant average cost are not dramatic.
The direct effect of each variable in Table 13 except for output is
smaller than the corresponding total effect because the indirect effect
associated with that variable works in the same direction as the direct
effect. In the average direct cost function the largest percentage de-
cline caused by the inclusion of the inefficiency index is associated
with the Medicaid coefficient, which falls by 13.2 percent. In the aver-
age total cost function the 21.9 percent decline in the Medicaid coeff 1—
cient ranks second to the 25.1 percent decline in the private health
insurance coefficient. Note that with one exception the direct effects of
age and the three financing variables are statistically significant in the
regressions in Table Therefore, the total effects of these variables
are not due solely to their impacts on allocative efficiency. It cannot
be ascertained whether the direct effects are attributed to differences in
casemix, scope of services, technical efficiency, or other factors.
VI. Summary and Implications
The purpose of this paper has been to assess the economic performance
of community health centers in delivering ambulatory medical care to pov-
erty populations. Throughout the paper the focus has been on the extent
of departures from cost minimization, the determinants of such departures,
and their impacts on the cost of services. The main empirical results in
the paper and their policy implications can be summarized as follows.— 78—
Inputdecisions by CHCs do reflect departures from cost—minimizing be-
havior. In particular, the centers employ too few physician aids (nurses
and physician assistants) relative to primary care physicians and too many
medical support and ancillary personnel relative to primary care physicians.
These findings suggest that it is misleading to criticize CRCs for employ-
ing too much non—physician labor, as has been done by the General Accounting
Office (14). Instead, it is important to distinguish among different types
of inputs. When compared with similar studies of the efficient selection of
inputs by private sector physicians, these findings also suggest that CHCs
do not make less efficient selections of inputs than profit—motivated
Drivate physicians. To be sure, the incentives of private physicians to
minimize cost are diluted somewhat by third—party reimbursement on a fee—
for—service basis. Moreover, incentives exist for CHCs to minimize cost,
particularly if they seek to maximize a utility function that depends on the
quantity and quality of services delivered and operate on budgets whose size
is determined by the number of enrollees rather than on the amount of ser-
vices delivered.
Allocative inefficiency responds to alternative financing mechanisms in
the expected direction. Specifically, Medicaid or private health insurance
reimbursement on a fee—for—service basis increases allocative inefficiency
which in turn raises average cost. This calls into question the recommenda-
tion made by the General Accounting Office (14) that centers should try to
maximize their nongrant revenue. Our results indicate that centers who
receive a relatively large percentage of their revenues from grants select
more appropriate input mixes than other centers and therefore have lower
costs. This does not mean that Medicaid financing of CHCs should be dis-
couraged per Se. For instance, the level of allocative efficiency would— 79—
notfall and might even rise if the Medicaid program were used to promote
the delivery of services on a prepaid capitation basis. Under one such
plan, the state Medicaid programs could make the prepayments for Medicaid-
eligible persons who choose to enroll in CHCs. Under a second plan,
Medicaid—eligible persons could be issued vouchers directly which they
could use to enroll in CHCs. Both plans have been promoted by the
Reagan Administration in an attempt to promote competition and control
inflation in the health care sector. Our findings imply that a CRC system
financed to a large extent by Medicaid prepayment is not inconsistent with
these goals and even might help to achieve them.
The average cost function of CHC5 is characterized by moderate econo-
mies of scale, but smaller centers select more appropriate input mixes
than larger centers. Since the average cost function is fairly flat, the
costs of building a number of centers in the same area to encourage access
are not substantial. Moreover, if per capita transportation costs are con-
sidered, such a policy might even lower costs. This is because per capita
transportation costs are negatively related to the number of centers in an
area. In turn, the fewer the number of centers the larger is the output of
any one center.
Under the assumption that the centers in our study are representative
of the roughly 800 centers in existence in 1980, the CRC system—wide cost
reduction due to the elimination of allocative inefficiency amounts to
$32 million in 1978 dollars. At a time of tight Federal and state budgets
and a rapid rate of inflation in the cost of medical care, a cost reduc-
tion of this magnitude should be encouraged if it is not too difficult to
achieve. But the decline in cost is modest; it equals approximately 6
percent of the CRC system—wide total cost.— 80—
Theabove results seriously question the conventional wisdom that ser-
vices in the public sector are produced less efficiently than in the pri-
vate sector. We find no evidence that allocative inefficiency is more
widespread among CHCs than among private sector physicians. Moreover,
although there are statistically significant departures from cost—minimizing
behavior in the CHC system, their impacts on the cost of care are relatively
small. Elsewhere, we have shown that the CHC program has played an important
role in the decline in infant mortality, especially black infant mortality,
since 1965 [Goldman and Grossman (17)]. Thus, we conclude from our two stud-
ies that the CHC program is an effective vehicle to achieve the goal of im-
provementsinthe health of the poor. Substantial improvements appear to
havebeenaccomplished, and the costs in terms of departures from the
optimal utilization of inputs appear to be small.F—i
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LFordetailed descriptions of the development of CEC5, see Lave and
Leinhardt (1), Hollister et al. (2), Reynolds (3), Seacat (4), Davis and
Schoen (5), Plaska and Manseau (6), and Roemer (7). The CHCs studied in
this paper are not limited to those that follow the Neighborhood Health
Center, Rural Health Initiative, or Urban Health Initiative program
designs. Also included are those that follow the Family Health Center,
Community Health Network, and Hospital—Affiliated Primary Care Center
designs. The firsttwo designs, which date to the early l970s, emphasize
thedelivery of services on a prepaid capitation basis, the former in
rural areas andthelatter inurban areas. The originalintent was for
thestate Medicaid program to make the prepayment for Medicaid—eligibleF- 2
persons. This did not meet with great success, andthefamily health center
and network terms were dropped. Support for these centers through Medicaid
fee—for—service payments has gradually increased [Roemer (7)]. The latter
designis more recent and pertains to a primary care group practice oper-
ating ina hospital outpatient department with a billing and cost structure
thatis distinct fromtherest of the hospital. For more information on
these designs, see Plaska and Manseau (6).
2Maternalandinfant care projects originatedinthe 1963 amendments
toTitle V of the Social Security Act of 1935. Children and youth projects
originated in the 1965 amendments to Title V. Federal subsidization of
clinics that deliver family planning services to low—income women initially
can be traced to the 1967 amendments to Title V. Federal efforts in this
area were expanded in 1970 with the passage of the Family Planning Services
and Population Research Act (Title X of the Public Health Services Act).
Note that other types of clinics within the Federal delivery system, such
as Appalachian healthcenters, black lung clinics, and migrant health cen-
ters, arenot considered either conceptually or empirically in this paper.
This is because these clinics are few in number and relatively new. More-
over, unlike CHCs, black lung clinics focus on one particular disease,
while migrant health centers service transitory population groups.
3See, for example, Reinhardt (8), ICehrer and Zaretsky (9), Smith et al.
(10), Gollady et al. (11), Zeckhauser andEfliastam(12), and Brownand
Lapan (13).F— 3
41n addition to efficiency in the production of ambulatorycare, there
are two other standards to evaluate the CRC system. These are the effi-
ciency of this public health system in identifying low—income, medically
underserved areas with poor initial health levels and the impact of the
centers on health outcomes. We have studied these issues elsewhere
(GoldmanandGrossman (17)].
51f factor supply curves are not perfectly elastic, condition (3) still
holds provided each supply curve has the same constant elasticity.
6We have experimented with a second measure of inefficiency given by
e •= Cr.. — 1)2
ijt
Resultsobtained with this measure were very similar to those obtained with
the measure described in the text.
7
See, for example, Reinhardt (8), Kehrer and Zaretsky (9), Brown and
Lapan(13),Feldstein (25), Boaz (26), and Pauly (27).F— 4
8Empirically, we examine both the efficient choice of physician aids
relative to physicians and the efficient choice of other personnel relative
to physicians. Sometimes the actual value of the physician input as well
as the natural logarithm of this input is included in the transcendental
production function. We experiment with this specification in Section IV.
The properties of the production function highlighted below are not altered





which is positive if a3 exceeds zero.
'0Boaz (26) computes a measure which is similar tor21 but does not ex-
amine the determinants of inefficiency or its role in the average cost func-
tion.
11For detailed discussions of allocative and technical efficiency, see
Leibenstein (28) and Welch (29).
12Theabove definitionof economies or diseconomies of scale is more
generalthan one based on the returns to scale parameter in the production.
Aproductionfunction has constant returns to scale ifoutputdoubles when
all inputs double, increasing returns to scale ifoutputmore than doubles,
and decreasingreturns to scale if outputless than doubles. Ifinput
pricesare independent of the level of inputs, increasing returns to scale
implies falling average cost, decreasing returns implies rising averageF- 5
cost, andconstantreturns implies constant average cost. The definition
in the text is more comprehensive because a production function could have
constant returns to scale, but average cost could rise with output if some
inputs could not be varied and fall with output if input prices fell as
the amounts of the inputs purchased rose.
'3Let c be the totalproductcost of output x, and let q be total
patient andemployeetransportation cost associated with output x. Total






Differentiate the last equation with respect to x to obtain
(dac*/dx) (dac/dx) + (dt/dx)
If dt/dx exceeds zero, dac*/dx mayexceedzero even if dac/dx is less than
zero.
14Supposethat a policy maker wants to minimize the total cost of a
given output of the entire CRC system in the UnitedStates,andsuppose
that all centers have identical cost functions.Toaccomplish this goal,F- 6
output should be allocated among centers such that marginal cost is the same
in each center andeachcenter is producing at the minimum point on its
average cost function. If the total output of the system is less than the
output of each center multiplied by the number of centers, some centers
shouldbe closed down.(For proof of this proposition and modifications
inthe case when cost functions differ, see Patinkin (37)]. Normatively,
sincecHCs service all parts of the United States, minimization of the
total cost of the combined output of the system is not a realistic policy
goal.
151f theaverage cost function is linear, the parameter estimate of
still is biased away from zero. In particular, the estimated value is
negative if the true value is zero.
16For a detailed description of the BCRR tape, seeBureauof Community
HealthServices (39).
17The BCRR tape contains data for 1977, but there is an extremely
largenumberof missing values for that year. Neighborhoodhealthcenters
are not designated as such on the tape. We identified them based on an
earlier BCIIS publication (40).
18Psychiatric encounters are reported as a separate category, but they
account for less than 1 percent of all medical encounters. These encoun-
ters are excluded from the medical encounter variable used in this study.
9In the case of NHSC personnel, the centers must reimburse a portion
of their salaries to the Federal government. The reimbursement formula is
based in part on the revenues generated by these personnel.F— 7
20 fact the initial service date must be June 1978 or earlier. This
eliminates centers who began to operate in the latter part of 1978 and thus
have limited data for that year.
21This count excludes centers who failed to file at least onereport
during the period from 1977 through 1980. It also excludes centers lo-
cated in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.
22Strictly speaking, missing values cannot be distinguished from zero
values on the BCRR tape. The algorithm used here is to assume that zero
values for the above variables denote missing data, while zero values for
other variables are "true zeros."
23Offsite encounters are reported separately. They pertain to en-
counters both between CRC users and CRC staff and between CRC users and
nonetaff. These two types of of fsite encounters cannot be distinguished.
24Otherinputs, such as medical equipment, floor space, and adminis-
trative personnel, are omitted from the production function. These ex-
clusionsare due to the absenceof disaggregated measures in physical
units and due to the problemof allocating inputs thatgenerate indirect
costs.
25Fora justification of the use of average cost weights, see Feld—
stein (25).
26Feldstein (25)argues that the average cost weights obtained by the
aboveprocedurecan be viewed as useful approximations even when average
costdepends on output and other variables.F—8
27The regressionalso was estimated with average total medical care
costas the dependent variable •Theweights obtained were almost identical
in relative terms to those reported in the text. Note that little should
be inferred about the wage rate of physician aids relative to primary care
physicians from the regression results because an aid may spend a longer
amount of time with a patient at an encounter than a primary care physi-
cian.
28The above measure differs from but is highly correlated with
(r =.984)a simple two—year average of unit cost in each year. The
variable used is a weighted average of annual unit cost, where the
weightis the fraction of encounters in each year.
shouldbe stressedthattheassumption of constantaverage cost
in the production context simply is used to approximate a set of weights
tocalculate weighted output. Moreover, our mainreason for fitting
productionfunctions is to examine inefficiency in the selection of in-
puts rather than to examine the extent of economies of scale.
3Ol centers are smallemployersrelative to their local market
areas.Therefore, there is little reason to expect them to have sig-
nificant aunts of monopsony power.
31The ten Federal regions and the states within each region are as
follows:F- 9
Boston (Maine,Vermont, Mass., Conn., R.I., N.H.)
NewYork (N.Y., N.J.)
Philadelphia (Penn., Del., D.C., Maryland, Va., W. Va.)
Atlanta (Ala., Fla., Georgia, Ky., Miss., N.C., S.C., Tenn.)
Chicago (Ill., Indiana, Minn., Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin)
Dallas (Arkansas, N.M., Oklahoma, Texas, Louisiana)
Kansas City(Iowa, Kansas,Missouri, Nebraska)
Denver (Cob.,Montana,N. D., S.D., Utah, Wyoming)
SanFrancisco(Ariz., Calif., Hawaii, Hey.)
Seattle (Alaska, Idaho, Oregon, Washington).
These designations are basedonthe city in which each of the tenFederal
regional offices is located.
the computation of mean net income by region and size of county,
observations are weighted by the inverse of the probability of selection.
The resulting weighted means are, however, very similar to unweighted means.
Net income of medical and surgical specialists is excluded from the cost
function becauseitis highly correlated with net income of primary care
physiciansCr =.652).Moreover, as mentioned above, we do not study the
efficient choice of these two typesofpersonnel.
33
The above analysis also applies if CHCs reimburse the Federal gov-
ernment for kpercent of the wages of NHSC personnel. Inthat case, the
relevant price of input y is the net price:
w. =w.(1 —k) i 1
wherew. is the gross price (the wage actually received by inputItis
clear that
(wj/wj) =(wj/wj)F —10
34Wlienthe marginal product of an input becomes negative, the isoquant
begins to slope upward.
35Statements concerning statistical significance in the text are based
onone—tailed tests except when the direction of theeffect is unclear on a
priorigrounds or when the estimated effect has the "wrong sign." In the
latter cases two—tailed tests are used.
361fa2 is the regression coefficient of PA and a3 is the regression
coefficient of PASQ, the output elasticity of PA is a1 PA +2cz2PASQ.
Output elasticities of 0 and MS are obtained in the same manner.
above comments also applyto theaverage cost functionsthat
include the inefficiency index in Section V.
38Sometimes the elasticity of the average cost function is defined as
the elasticity of output with respect to average cost. If this convention
is used, the ADMC elasticities are —28.57 at the mean, —10.59 at one stan-
dard deviation above the mean, and—6.54at twostandarddeviations above
the mean. The corresponding ATMC elasticities are —32.26, —12.35, and
—7.41.
390ne explanation of the negative Medicare reimbursement effect is
that the variable is a proxy for the percentage of elderly medical users
who are eligible for Medicare, andtheseusers have minor medical prob-
lents. DavisandSchoen(5) reportthatthe elderly poorareunder—
represented in the population of patients treated in CUCS. This may be
because theCHCS cannot provideadequate medical care for some of the
seriousmedical problems associated with old age or because the elderlyF —11
are less mobile than other groups in the population. Hence, elderly medical
users of CHCs probably are relatively healthy. Note that an increase in
the fraction of users ages 65 and over (FM65) leads to a reduction in aver-
age cost.
40The omission of OHPE or NE slightly weakens the coefficients of
PCPNI because as explained in Section V PCPNI is negatively correlated
with these two variables. But the coefficients of PCPNI retain their
significance at the 10 percent level.
4mis is the relevant test because the direction of the effect is
unclearon a priori grounds. To the extent that offsite encounters occur
inhospitals, they should be more expensive. It is likely, however, that
some of the costs of of fsite encouners are not reported.
421n the computation of RPAP, the mean of NE divided by the mean of
PCPNIisused rather than the mean of WPAP.The mean of WPP is, however,
almostidentical to NE/PCPNI. The same conmtent applies to the computation
of HOP. As shownby equations (9) and(10),RPAP exceeds RPAPand HOP ex-
ceeds POP. The difference between POP and HOP is larger than that between
RPAPand RPAP because the standard deviation of other personnel exceeds
that of physician aids and becausethe simple correlation between other
personnel and physicians Cr =.880)exceeds that between physician aids
and physicians Cr =.675).
43Both Reinhardt (8) and Brown and Lapan (13) make efficiencycompu-
tations at sample means rather than making them separately for each physi-
cian and then averaging. In the latter study this may not introduce muchF —12
bias because equal cost sharing groups are excluded. Note that our inter-
pretation of Brown and Lapan's results differs somewhat from their own
interpretation. They estimate a production function with six inputs and
examine the efficient choice of each input relative to physicians. But
they also compute a weighted (by hours worked) average of the marginal
product of all five aids. From this computation, they conclude that
physicians employ the appropriate number of aids. We question the value
of this calculation since the composite aid input is disaggregated in the
productionfunction.
44
The marginal product of physician aids is negativefor one center
andthat of other personnel is negative for ten centers. Hence, RPAP has
one negative value and ROP has ten negative values. When RPAP is negative,
the inefficiency index is given by a simple average of EPA and a value
slightly greater than the maximum value of EPA for the 324 centers for
whom RPAP is positive. A similar procedure is employed when ROP is nega-
tive. This estimate is used because, if the marginal product of one input
is negative, the inefficiency index may be a misleading indication of the
magnitude of the departure from cost minimization. Since very few centers
have negative marginal products, the results in Sections V.B and V.C are
not sensitive to this procedure.
45Coefficients of independent variables other than 0MB are not af-
fected by the inclusion of OMBSQ.
46The Area Resource File is a county—based data service prepared by
Applied Management Sciences, Inc., for the Bureau of Health Professions,
Health Resources Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services.F —13
471n aUcasesEPA andEOtakenasa set are significant determinants
of average cost.
48Estimates of cost savings are not sensitive to alternativecompu—
tationalmethods.Forexample, the estimates are similar to those re-
ported in the text if the computations are made separately for regressions
with EPAorEO and then averaged.
49The exception pertains to the coefficient of private health insur-
ance in regression (12—2).References
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